Essays on radiology services utilization in the United States by Horný, Michal
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2017
Essays on radiology services
utilization in the United States
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/27162
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Dissertation
ESSAYS ON RADIOLOGY SERVICES UTILIZATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
by
MICHAL HORNY´
Bc., Charles University, Czechia, 2008
Bc., Charles University, Czechia, 2010
MSc., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2012
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2017
© 2017 by
MICHAL HORNY´
All rights reserved
Approved by
First Reader
Alan B. Cohen, Sc.D.
Research Professor of Health Policy and Management
Boston University, Questrom School of Business
Second Reader
Cindy L. Christiansen, Ph.D.
Third Reader
Michael Shwartz, Ph.D., MBA
Richard D. Cohen Professor in Management
Professor of Operations and Technology Management
Boston University, Questrom School of Business
Fourth Reader
Kathleen Carey, Ph.D.
Professor of Health Law, Policy and Management
Fifth Reader
Natasha K. Stout, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Population Medicine
Harvard Medical School
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute
Sixth Reader
Sean Nicholson, Ph.D.
Professor of Economic and Policy Analysis and Management
Cornell University
In memory of James F. Burgess, Jr., a great mentor, teacher, and my friend.
iv
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, my deepest appreciation goes to my primary academic adviser
James (Jim) F. Burgess, Jr. Jim had been a supportive and inspiring mentor, as
well as a fully committed teacher whose guidance had been invaluable throughout
the course of my study. The moments during our conversations when my “ordinary
human” mind was incapable of keeping up with his brilliant thoughts were priceless.
Jim had been supporting me in every stage of my studies, and he refused to ease
up these efforts even when he had to cope with his severe health condition. I will
always be grateful for his kindness, generosity, and commitment to help me grow
both professionally and personally. Jim passed away on Monday, June 26, 2017, and
has been missed tremendously ever since.
I owe a significant debt to my advisers Alan Cohen, Michael Shwartz, and Cindy
Christiansen for their extraordinarily kind and supportive guidance. Their opinions
and advice have helped me navigate through the dissertation process as well as to
succeed on the academic job market. I have greatly benefited from many discussions
with Rich Duszak of Emory University who offered his time and expertise to help me
understand the world of Radiology from a clinical standpoint. I thank the outside
readers, Natasha Stout and Sean Nicholson, for providing valuable insights into this
research.
This dissertation research would not be possible without generous funding from
the Harvey L. Neiman Health Policy Institute™ of the American College of Radiology.
v
I am especially thankful to Danny Hughes for his active mentorship, continuous
professional support, and providing access to several key data sets. I would also like
to acknowledge JUDr. Frantiˇsek Talia´n for financial assistance in the first years of
my graduate studies.
I would like to express my gratitude to several faculty members at Boston Uni-
versity that were essential to my professional growth: Kathleen Carey, Vicky Parker,
Lewis Kazis, Howard Cabral, Randy Ellis, Ted Stefos, Yorghos Tripodis, Jack Clark,
Marty Charns, Gouri Gupte, Jacob Bor, Albert Ma, David Jones, Rani Elwy, Bar-
bara Bokhour, Lisa Sullivan, and Jed Horwitt. I greatly appreciate the feedback
offered by Christine Gunn, Nancy Kressin, Tracy Battaglia, Amresh Hanchate, Wen-
jia Zhu, Jonathan Gruber, as well as by members of the BU SPH Econometrics in
Public Health study group, members of the BU SPH Doctoral Student Organization,
and members of the BU Health Economics Reading Group. The assistance of Wenyi
Wang was vital to the preparation of Medicare claims data for the analysis.
Working toward a doctorate was not easy by any means. However, difficult
times were never hopeless thanks to my amazing and supportive friends at Boston
University: Ashley, Jake, Vanessa, Leigh, Jackie, Molly, Marina, Meng-Yun, Judy,
Keri, Maryum, Kevin, Eric, Rene´, Serena, Vera, Ryan, Trina, Carolina, Theresa,
Rebecca, and Kelly.
I sincerely thank my parents and grandparents on whom I can always rely. They
brought me up to be independent, have provided me with ongoing emotional and
moral support, and instilled the confidence in me to succeed. I am infinitely grateful
to my fiance´e Emily who has been by my side throughout all the ups and downs
of the dissertation process and has been unbelievably understanding and supportive
under all circumstances.
vi
ESSAYS ON RADIOLOGY SERVICES UTILIZATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
MICHAL HORNY´
Boston University School of Public Health, 2017
Major Professor: James F. Burgess, Jr., Ph.D.
Professor of Health Law, Policy and Management
ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates how policies and financial incentives may affect the use
of services within the United States health care system. The research consists of
two distinct parts: Part I comprises two studies examining the impact of recently
enacted state legislation regarding dense breast tissue on the use of downstream
imaging; Part II delves into changes in physician reimbursement and their effect on
health care delivery.
Dense breast tissue is a common finding that decreases the sensitivity of mam-
mography in detecting cancer. Some states have passed legislation requiring health
care providers to notify patients with dense breast tissue that identification of early
cancers may be compromised. Others have also aimed to increase access to supple-
mental screening tests by requiring health plans to include such follow-up options in
covered benefits. The legislation has been controversial because supplemental imag-
ing following a negative screening mammogram for patients with no other risk factors
provides little benefit compared to its substantial cost.
In the first study, we analyzed whether the dense breast tissue notification laws af-
fected the probability of screening mammography follow-up by ultrasound and mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI). We found strong evidence that implementing the
vii
notification legislation led to an increase in the probability of downstream breast ul-
trasound imaging in most states, and to an increase in the probability of downstream
breast MRI in some states. In the second study, we identified specific characteristics
of various state-level dense breast policies that were associated with increased use of
downstream breast ultrasound imaging.
In Part II of the dissertation, we assessed the extent to which changes in health
care prices affect the provision of health services by physicians in various medical
and surgical specialties in both Medicare and the private sector. We exploited the
considerable changes in the Medicare Physician Fee schedule due to procedural code
bundling that happened between 2010 and 2014 as the source of variation in health
care prices. Our results showed that volume responses to changes in health care prices
are inelastic and vary in both direction and magnitude by specialty and sector.
viii
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Part I
Legislation regarding dense breast
tissue
1
Chapter 1
Review of the relevant literature
1.1 Dense breast tissue
Breast tissue consists of milk ducts, milk glands, fatty tissue, and supportive fibro-
glandular tissue, also known as dense breast tissue. The dense tissue decreases the
sensitivity of mammography by masking potential cancer (Kerlikowske, Grady, et
al. 1996; Rosenberg et al. 1998; Mandelson et al. 2000; Kolb, Lichy, and Newhouse
2002; Carney et al. 2003; Berg, Gutierrez, et al. 2004; Buist et al. 2004; Kriege,
Brekelmans, Obdeijn, et al. 2006; Osako et al. 2007; Chiu et al. 2010; Cook et al.
2010) and is itself an independent risk factor for breast cancer (Wolfe, Saftlas, and
Salane 1987; Boyd, Byng, et al. 1995; Byrne, Schairer, Wolfe, et al. 1995; Byrne,
Schairer, Brinton, et al. 2001; Ursin et al. 2003; Harvey and Bovbjerg 2004; Boyd,
Rommens, et al. 2005; Nagata et al. 2005; McCormack and Silva 2006; Boyd, Guo,
et al. 2007; Kotsuma et al. 2008; Wong et al. 2011; Assi et al. 2012; Machida et al.
2015). The relationship between breast tissue density and risk of breast cancer is
ambiguous, however, because breast tissue density is also inversely associated with
age and body mass index (Brisson et al. 1984; Boyd, Lockwood, et al. 1998; Vachon
et al. 2000; Marcus and Yepes 2013; Sprague, Gangnon, et al. 2014), which are both
known breast cancer risk factors.
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Assessment of breast tissue density is performed visually by a radiologist, who
then records the result in the patient’s medical report (Drukteinis et al. 2013). A re-
liable measure of breast tissue density has not been established yet. The primary
guidance on breast tissue density assessment in clinical use is part of the Breast
Imaging Reporting and Data System® (BI-RADS) developed by the American Col-
lege of Radiology. Breast composition is defined in four verbally described categories
(American College of Radiology 2013):
1. The breasts are almost entirely fatty
2. There are scattered areas of fibroglandular density
3. The breasts are heterogeneously dense, which may obscure small masses
4. The breasts are extremely dense, which lowers the sensitivity of mammography
The definition of the four breast density categories was previously based on the per-
centage ranges of dense tissue, but the latest definition removed these percentages “to
emphasize the text descriptions of breast density, which reflects the masking effect
of dense fibroglandular tissue on mammographic depiction of non-calcified lesions,
because. . . the association of subjectively estimated breast density with changes in
the sensitivity of mammography is clinically more important than the relatively
smaller effect of percentage breast density as an indicator of breast cancer risk”
(American College of Radiology 2013). Figure 1.1 shows an example of the four
breast tissue density categories.
The subjectivity of breast tissue density measurement has been widely criticized,
because of the strong evidence of poor inter- and intra-reader reliability (Berg, Cam-
passi, et al. 2000; Ooms et al. 2007; Salvatore et al. 2014; Gard et al. 2015). Auto-
mated software tools for breast tissue density measurement could potentially over-
3
Figure 1.1: Example of dense breast tissue categories (Berg 2015)
Notes: Fatty breast tissue (A), scattered breast density (B), heterogeneous breast
density (C), and extreme breast density (D).
come the inter- and intra-reader variability in breast density assessment. Such tools
are currently under development but have not been widely adopted yet (Drukteinis
et al. 2013).
The ratio of dense and fatty tissue varies substantially across women. Approx-
imately 30-50% of women have heterogeneously dense or extremely dense breasts
according to the BI-RADS classification (Sprague, Gangnon, et al. 2014; Scheel et
al. 2015). Currently, there is no evidence that women with dense breast tissue would
benefit from a more frequent breast cancer screening than what is generally recom-
mended (White et al. 2004; Kerlikowske, Zhu, et al. 2015). Experts in the field agree
that breast tissue density is an important piece of information in the assessment
of a personalized risk for breast cancer, but it should not be the only criterion for
justifying additional imaging (Kerlikowske, Zhu, et al. 2015).
The general population has limited knowledge of breast tissue density and its
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potential consequences. According to a survey, 62% of women had heard about breast
tissue density as a risk factor for breast cancer (O’Neill et al. 2014). The awareness is
better among white, educated women with other breast cancer risk factors (Manning,
Duric, et al. 2013; O’Neill et al. 2014). Patient’s breast density, however, usually
does not change over a short period of time. Cohen et al. (2014) showed that “the
breast density of the current and most recent prior mammogram was stable for 86.6%
of patients.” Therefore, the authors suggested that “primary care providers could
discuss breast density and recommend supplemental breast cancer screening using
the density of the previous mammography” (Cohen et al. 2014) in order to reduce the
burden of additional appointments and to moderate the demand for supplemental
breast cancer screening based on individual characteristics and risk factors. The
degree to which primary care physicians do so is unknown.
1.2 Options for supplemental breast cancer testing
If increased breast density limits the sensitivity of mammography, there are several
options for supplemental breast cancer testing. Potential imaging modalities include
breast ultrasound, breast MRI, and digital breast tomosynthesis. Positron emis-
sion mammography is usually not used for preventive screening purposes due to the
immense radiation exposure (Drukteinis et al. 2013).
1.2.1 Ultrasound
Breast ultrasound is the most common modality for supplemental breast imaging due
to its widespread availability and relatively low price compared to other modalities.
Adding ultrasound imaging after a negative finding on a mammogram can have both
favorable and unfavorable outcomes. A number of studies explored the effectiveness
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of additional ultrasound screening after an inconclusive mammogram due to dense
breast tissue but found unconvincing results. For example, a study conducted in
Connecticut after implementation of the notification law documented that supple-
mental ultrasound imaging revealed 3 additional breast cancers among 935 women
screened (3.2 cancers in 1,000 women screened) after a negative mammogram (Hoo-
ley et al. 2012). However, the additional ultrasound imaging also resulted in 44 false
positives in the same cohort (47.1 false positives in 1,000 women screened). Similar
findings were obtained from (Berg, Blume, et al. 2008): adding an ultrasound to the
standard mammography screening revealed 1.1 to 7.2 additional breast cancers, but
yielded also a substantial increase in false positive results. In other words, a mam-
mography alone led to 23.2 unnecessary biopsies in 1,000 women screened, while the
combination of a mammography and ultrasound led to 92.6 unnecessary biopsies in
1,000 women screened (Berg, Blume, et al. 2008). On the other hand, a retrospec-
tive review confirmed that more than 80% of cancers detected by breast ultrasound
imaging were not seen in the previous mammogram (Bae et al. 2013).
Sprague, Stout, et al. (2015) compared the benefits, harms, and costs of sup-
plemental testing by ultrasound after a negative screening mammography and con-
cluded that the incremental costs far exceeded the incremental benefits with an in-
cremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $325,000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY).
Among women aged 50 to 74 years with heterogeneously or extremely dense breasts
whose mammograms were negative, supplemental ultrasound imaging averted 0.36
additional breast cancer deaths, gained 1.7 QALYs, and led to additional 354 un-
necessary biopsies per 1,000 women screened compared to mammography screening
alone (Sprague, Stout, et al. 2015). A systematic literature review confirmed that
supplemental ultrasound screening in women with dense breasts is associated with
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a small increase in breast cancer detection, but also with a higher number of false
positives leading to unnecessary biopsies and increased patient anxiety (Scheel et al.
2015). Moreover, increased supplemental breast cancer testing may raise an already
high breast cancer overdiagnosis rate that is the product of screening mammography
alone (Moss 2005; Zackrisson et al. 2006; Duffy et al. 2010; Independent UK Panel
on Breast Cancer Screening 2012; Kalager et al. 2012; Molleran 2015).
Automated breast ultrasound imaging aims to reduce the variability in skills
and experience among physicians and other clinicians performing breast ultrasound
examinations, and to provide a more standardized examination. The effectiveness of
automated breast ultrasounds has not been explored thoroughly yet. A retrospective
study documented a significant increase in breast cancer detection and an improved
inter-reader agreement in women with dense breast tissue when the combination of
mammography and automated breast ultrasound was used compared to mammogra-
phy alone (Drukker et al. 2013). However, the study did not examine whether there
was an increase in false positive results. Therefore, it is not clear how the automated
breast ultrasound compares to the standard ultrasound in terms of breast cancer
detection and the rate of false positive results.
1.2.2 Magnetic resonance imaging
Breast MRI has higher sensitivity but lower specificity than a mammography or ul-
trasound (Kriege, Brekelmans, Boetes, et al. 2004; Taneja et al. 2009; Berg, Zhang,
et al. 2012). The literature documents that adding MRI examination to mammogra-
phy and breast ultrasounds among women at high risk would detect additional 14.7
cancers per 1,000 women screened (Berg, Zhang, et al. 2012). However, there is cur-
rently no evidence of a reduction in mortality from breast cancer due to MRI testing
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(Drukteinis et al. 2013). Adding MRI examination to the standard mammographic
screening is cost-effective compared to the standard mammographic screening alone
only for high-risk women with BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene mutation (Taneja et al. 2009)
and is only recommended as a supplemental screening for high-risk women (Mainiero
et al. 2013).
1.2.3 Digital breast tomosynthesis
Digital breast tomosynthesis, sometimes referred to as 3D mammography, is the
newest breast imaging modality available in many health care markets (Trubo 2015).
A few studies showed reduced recall rates after digital breast tomosynthesis screening.
Given the commonly cited willingness-to-pay threshold of $100,000 per QALY gained,
the incremental benefit of adding digital breast tomosynthesis to digital screening
mammography among women with heterogeneously dense or extremely dense breast
tissue seems to be worth the incremental cost with the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio of $53,893 per QALY gained (Lee, Cevik, et al. 2014).
1.3 Legislation regarding dense breast tissue
1.3.1 Current state
The case of Nancy R. Cappello in 2003, a patient from Connecticut who was diag-
nosed with late-stage breast cancer a few weeks after a negative mammogram (Cap-
pello 2013), placed a spotlight on breast density and its potential adverse impact on
the diagnostic sensitivity of mammography. As a result, patient groups and public
charities, such as Are You Dense Advocacy, Inc., started lobbying state and federal
policymakers to pass legislation to improve education about breast density among
the general public and to enhance the earlier detection of breast cancer.
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Currently, 31 states have enacted legislation in response to issues in mammogra-
phy screening in women with increased breast density (Dehkordy and Carlos 2013;
Kressin, Gunn, and Battaglia 2016). Given the lack of consensus among health care
professionals and the limited scientific evidence about best practices in this setting,
variation exists in several important characteristics of the adopted policies (Bolan
2013; Marcus and Yepes 2013; Slanetz, Freer, and Birdwell 2015).
Most states have enacted laws that mandate health care providers1 to notify
patients about their assessed breast density classification and to provide them with
information about the increased risk of breast cancer associated with dense breast
tissue (hereinafter, a notification laws). Some states have mandated providers to send
such notification to all patients who had undergone screening mammography, while
other states have required providers to send such notifications only to women with
heterogeneously dense or extremely dense breast tissue based on the Breast Imaging
Reporting and Data System® established by the American College of Radiology.
Some states mandate specific notification language (Hall 2013). In some states,
notifications must explicitly mention that patients might benefit from supplemental
screening tests, such as breast ultrasound imaging or breast MRI. In Utah, the
legislation vaguely suggests that the notification “may be included in mammography
results sent to a patient with dense breast tissue.” This wording makes sending the
notification optional, rather than a requirement.
Illinois has taken a different approach. Its 2014 law required the state’s Depart-
ment of Public Health to “publish, in layman’s language, a standardized written
summary outlining methods for the early detection and diagnosis of breast cancer”
1Depending on state, the responsibility for sending the notification is borne by either the physi-
cian issuing the report of the mammography, the facility that performed the screening mammogra-
phy, or the owner, lessee or other person responsible for the radiation machine for mammography
that was used to perform the mammography.
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Figure 1.2: States with legislation regarding dense breast tissue in 2017
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(hereinafter, a summary law), but it does not specify how that summary should be
distributed, nor does it mandate health care providers to send a summary to pa-
tients. This approach theoretically could reach a wider audience; on the other hand,
such information is not relevant to all patients and may be ignored by those who
might benefit from it the most.
Because access to additional breast cancer testing might be limited for some
patients due to financial reasons (Harvey, Vegesna, et al. 2014; Slanetz, Freer, and
Birdwell 2015), a few states have enacted policies that require health insurance plans
to include supplemental screening options in covered benefits (hereinafter, an insu-
rance law). Connecticut and Indiana, for example, implemented such a policy years
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before enacting their notification law ; Illinois implemented it a few years before
enacting the summary law ; and New Jersey implemented it together with the no-
tification law. In the remaining states, individual health plans can decide whether
supplemental imaging is included as part of the plan’s benefits. Therefore, financial
strains may still lead to limited access to supplemental imaging for some women.
Figure 1.2 shows the states that implemented some form of legislation regarding
breast density by 2017 and Table 1.1 summarizes the dates of implementation by
state. To eliminate the variation in several aspects of the legislation across states
and to ensure equal access to information, a federal bill was introduced in the Senate
but it died with the end of the Obama Administration. Nevertheless, the U.S. Food &
Drug Administration is working on extending the Mammography Quality Standards
Act to standardize breast density reporting nationwide (Bolan 2013).
1.3.2 Existing research
Although the legislation regarding dense breast tissue aims to improve communica-
tion between patients and health care providers, and thus improve the quality of
patient-centered care, it may have many unintended consequences. Kressin, Gunn,
and Battaglia (2016) found that the notifications in most states were difficult to
understand for less educated patients. Many women perceive an exaggerated risk of
breast cancer after reviewing such notifications, possibly related to the poor under-
standability of mandated notifications; they also experience unnecessary anxiety and
report intentions to undergo additional breast cancer testing (Yeh et al. 2015). The
intention strength varied by internal factors such as ambiguity aversion, and external
factors such as health insurance coverage of the supplemental screening.
The results of an earlier randomized controlled trial in Canada, however, do not
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support this concern (Bottorff et al. 2007). Women randomized to the intervention
group received information about breast density and its role as a risk factor for breast
cancer. At a 6-month follow-up, women in the intervention group did not intend to
have more clinical breast examinations than women in the control group (Bottorff
et al. 2007). Moreover, the study did not find any statistically significant differences
in any other behavioral or psychological measures.
Currently, limited evidence exists about the effect of the legislation regarding
dense breast tissue on the utilization of downstream breast imaging. Two single-
site studies from New Jersey reported a substantial increase in the use of breast
ultrasounds following the enactment of that state’s notification and insurance law.
Sobotka and Hinrichs (2015) studied the use of breast ultrasounds within several
months after a screening mammography and found an increase in follow-up rates
from 17.6% pre-legislation to approximately 42.2% post-legislation. However, that
study was based on a sample from a single regional medical center in northwest New
Jersey and lacked a clear definition of the post-screening mammography interval for
follow-up imaging. The other study focusing on legislation in New Jersey assessed
only the absolute utilization rates of supplemental imaging by ultrasound and MRI
(Sanders, King, and Goodman 2016) and suffered from similar limitations.
1.4 Breast cancer screening guidelines
The guidelines for preventive breast cancer screening issued by the U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force (USPSTF) in 2002 recommended a screening mammography
with or without clinical breast examination every 1-2 years for women aged 40 and
older (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force 2002). The guidelines changed again
in 2009 when the USPSTF recommended biennial screening mammography only for
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women 50-74 years. The USPSTF suggested that the “decision to start regular, bien-
nial screening mammography before the age of 50 years should be an individual one
and take patient context into account, including the patient’s values regarding spe-
cific benefits and harms” (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force 2009). The literature
documents that the change in the USPSTF breast cancer screening recommendation
in 2009 did not have a significant impact on the patterns of screening mammography
age at initiation (Dehkordy, Hall, et al. 2015). Finally, there are currently no guide-
lines on supplemental breast cancer screening of women with mammographically
dense breasts.
1.5 Theoretical framework
Breast cancer screening is a complex process that involves patients, health care
providers, facilities, health care systems, and policymakers (Beaber et al. 2015; Har-
vey, Vegesna, et al. 2014; Onega et al. 2014). Figure 1.3 shows the conceptual model
of care delivery across domains for breast cancer screening developed by Onega et al.
(2014). Patient participation in breast cancer screening depends on several factors in-
cluding her demographics, personal and family history, health beliefs, current breast
cancer screening guidelines, as well as availability of the services in the locality, and
many others (Andersen 1995; Pasick and Burke 2008).
Despite its limited predictive power (Yarbrough and Braden 2001), the Health
Belief Model for preventive health behavior (Rosenstock 1974) has been used as the
theoretical framework for many studies of participation in breast cancer screening.
The model lists three conditions that must be satisfied for a person to take a recom-
mended preventive health action:
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Figure 1.3: Conceptual model of care delivery across domains for breast cancer
screening (Source: Onega et al., 2014)
denominator based on the number of women who do not
decline screening rather than all women of qualifying age.
Detection
The detection domain includes screening imaging, diagnos-
tic follow-up if applicable, and final assessment. Inherent in
this domain are several key concepts such as the perform-
ance of imaging modalities (particularly new technologies),
variations in interpretive performance, screening adherence,
and timeliness of follow-up. Each of these concepts has a
rich but incomplete evidence base, especially in terms of
how these factors interact with risk to affect outcomes. Pro-
cess measures for the detection domain should include
screening rates based on a denominator of eligible women
choosing to participate in screening, modality used in rela-
tion to risk, and timeliness of care. Outcome measures for
detection are well-established and include sensitivity, speci-
ficity, biopsy rate, positive predictive value, cancer detection
rate, and recall rate. These outcomes should be assessed for
population subgroups such as women at high risk and those
with dense breasts, and for new modalities. An important
aspect of the detection domain is to provide feedback
regarding process (such as referral completion) and outcome
(such as a positive mammogram)measures to inform appro-
priate subsequent care and potentially refine subsequent risk
assessments. Similarly, a percentage of screening examina-
tions will lead to recommendations for biopsy, which then
transition women into the diagnosis domain.
Diagnosis
The diagnostic phase may yield benign, in situ, or invasive
disease, which then stratifies women into risk categories
with regard to breast cancer mortality. A benign biopsy
may reveal precursor breast lesions that increase risk and
can be incorporated into future screening decisions. For
example, both atypical ductal and lobular hyperplasia are
Figure 2. A conceptual model of care delivery across domains is presented that represents risk-based and preference-based care
within multilevel systems. BI-RADS indicates Breast Imaging-Reporting and Data System; 2D, 2-dimensional; MRI, magnetic reso-
nance imaging; chemo, chemotherapy; PPV, positive predictive value; EOD, extent of disease.
Review Article
2960 Cancer October 1, 2014
1. The individual perceives a threat of a particular disease and is psychologically
ready to take action
2. The individual believes that the preventive health action or medical test is
feas ble and beneficial in terms of preventing the disease in question
3. A certain stimulus must occur to trigger action.
Part I of this dissertation focuses on the effect of policies that target patients who
have already undergone screening mammography. Thus, we may assume that health
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services related to breast cancer screening had been available at the patient’s locality
and that the necessary conditions laid out by the Health Beliefs Model were satisfied.
Patients who undergo screening mammography receive a mammogram report that
describes the findings. If the result of a mammogram is abnormal or inconclusive,
the patient is invited for a follow-up diagnostic imaging visit to determine the next
steps (Harvey, Vegesna, et al. 2014). The follow-up visit commonly involves diag-
nostic mammography, breast ultrasound, or MRI, and possibly a tissue examination
by breast biopsy. Although most patients become considerably worried after an ab-
normal finding on a mammogram and most wish to undergo additional examination,
some do not. In contrast, if the result of a mammogram is negative, the patient is
typically not called again until it is time to rescreen, which depends on the current
guidelines and the patient’s lifetime risk assessment (Harvey, Vegesna, et al. 2014).
During the assessment of a screening mammogram, radiologists evaluate the
mammographic density of the patient’s breast tissue (American College of Radiology
2013) and record it in the patient’s mammogram report. Breast density classifica-
tion is crucial for correct interpretation of a mammogram, especially in the case of
a negative result. However, this piece of information had been overlooked by most
patients due to unfamiliarity with the issue (Cappello 2013). Therefore, the legisla-
tion regarding dense breast tissue aimed to improve education about breast density
and its impact on the sensitivity of mammography among the general public. The
goal was to help patients who underwent screening mammography better understand
and interpret the result of their mammograms and to make better-informed decisions
about their health.
An adaptation of the Health Belief Model (Figure 1.4) serves as the core of the
theoretical framework of the studies presented in Part I of this dissertation. Ha-
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ving undergone screening mammography with a negative result, patients’ increased
awareness of breast density and its negative impact on the sensitivity of mammogra-
phy may increase the subjective uncertainty surrounding the received negative result.
Subsequently, patients may keep perceiving a considerable threat of breast cancer
and may take the recommended action – to talk to their health care provider about
the result of the mammogram and discuss the optimal strategy for breast cancer
prevention.
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Table 1.1: Current state of the legislation regarding dense breast tissue
State Bill number Status Notification Summary Insurance
AK
AL SB 22 Enacted Aug 1, 2013
AR
AZ SB 1225 Enacted Oct 1, 2014
CA SB 1538 Enacted Apr 1, 2013
CO
CT SB 458 Enacted Oct 1, 2009 Oct 1, 2005
DC
DE SB 37 Enacted Dec 21, 2015
FL SB 266 Pending
GA HB 324 Pending
HI HB 373 Enacted Jan 1, 2014
IA SF 205 Enacted Jan 1, 2016
ID
IL SB 2314 Enacted Jan 1, 2014 Jan 1, 2008
IN HB 1272 Enacted Jul 1, 2016 Jul 1, 2013
KS SB 407 Died
KY HB 20 Pending
LA HB 186 Enacted Jan 1, 2016
MA H 1050 Enacted Jan 1, 2015
MD SB 334 Enacted Oct 1, 2013
ME LD 1886 Pending
MI SB 879 Enacted Jun 1, 2015
MN LC 291 Enacted Aug 1, 2014
MO SB 639 Enacted Jan 1, 2015
MS HB 126 Pending
MT
NC HB 467 Enacted Jan 1, 2014
ND HB 1370 Enacted Apr 9, 2015
NE LB 876 Pending
NH HB 1273 Pending
NJ S 792 Enacted May 1, 2014 May 1, 2014
NM
NV AB 147 Enacted Jan 1, 2014
NY A 09586D Enacted Jan 19, 2013
Table continues on the next page.
17
State Bill number Status Notification Summary Insurance
OH HB 394 Enacted Mar 19, 2015
OK HB 2601 Enacted Nov 1, 2016
OR SB 420 Enacted Jan 1, 2014
PA SB 358 Enacted Jan 30, 2014
RI 23 12.9 Enacted Oct 1, 2014
SC S 339 Enacted May 12, 2016
SD
TN SB 745 Enacted Jan 1, 2014
TX HB 834 Enacted Sep 1, 2011
UT SB 32 Enacted May 8, 2012
VA HB 1778 Enacted Jun 1, 2012
VT S 157 Enacted Jan 15, 2017
WA SB 6146 Pending
WI
WV SB 281 Pending
WY
Notes: The table is a compilation of (Dehkordy and Carlos 2013; Kressin, Gunn,
and Battaglia 2016) and our own review of the enacted bills.
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A discussion between a patient and her health care provider about potential pre-
ventive strategies and other breast cancer screening options may lead to different
conclusions depending on the patient’s prior perceptions, preferences, health history
and other possessed risk factors, as well as on the provider’s knowledge, past experi-
ence, carefulness, and local practice style (Onega et al. 2014). The ultimate decision
of whether to undergo supplemental imaging by a modality other than mammogra-
phy may be influenced by perceived barriers such as the cost of the procedure with
respect to the patient’s financial situation. That is why some states have aimed to
remove this barrier by mandating health insurance plans to include supplemental
breast imaging due to increased breast density in the plan benefits.
1.6 Summary
Thirty-one states have enacted some form of legislation regarding dense breast tis-
sue. Most of these states enacted either a notification law or a summary law to
increase awareness about breast density among the general public, while only some
of these states also enacted an insurance law to increase the access to supplemental
imaging downstream of screening mammography for women with dense breasts. The
purpose of laws addressing awareness is to provide women with information about
breast density, the limitations of a mammography to find cancer in dense breast
tissue, and the increased risk of breast cancer for women with dense breast tissue.
Ultimately, the policy aims to help patients make better-informed decisions about
their own health. However, the provided information is not personalized as it does
not consider other personal risk factors. There is a significant amount of ambiguity
about the usefulness of this approach because it increases patient anxiety (Yeh et al.
2015) and may lead to unnecessary use of health care services. Moreover, because
20
evidence is lacking, physicians are often unclear about the next appropriate steps
for patients with dense breast tissue (Haas and Kaplan 2015; Marcus and Yepes
2013) and may offer supplemental breast imaging primarily as a means of avoiding
potential malpractice suits.
Currently, limited evidence exists about the effect of the legislation regarding
dense breast tissue on the utilization of downstream supplemental breast imaging.
Chapter 2 presents a study that investigates whether dense breast notification legisla-
tion affected the utilization of breast imaging by ultrasound and MRI in the privately
insured population in each state that implemented the law before the end of 2014.
Because the legislation regarding dense breast tissue varies in several aspects across
states, we extended our research to identify the specific aspects of the various state-
level policies that were associated with the increased use of breast ultrasounds – the
modality most likely to be performed downstream to a screening mammogram. We
present the findings of the latter study in Chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 4 provides
some concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Dense breast notification laws: Impact on
downstream imaging after screening
mammography
2.1 Research objective
The objective of the study was to test whether dense breast notification laws affected
the utilization of supplemental breast imaging by breast ultrasound and breast MRI
in the privately insured population in each state that implemented the law before
the end of 2014.
2.1.1 Hypotheses
• Implementation of a notification law increases the probability of follow-up
imaging by a breast ultrasound for women, who underwent screening mam-
mography.
• Implementation of a notification law increases the probability of follow-up
imaging by breast magnetic resonance imaging for women, who underwent
screening mammography.
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2.2 Methods
The first notification law came into effect in 2009 in Connecticut, and by the end
of 2014, 17 other states had enacted notification laws (Table 1.1). Legislation in
Connecticut pre-dating its notification law mandated that health plans pay for sup-
plemental breast imaging; this mandate was also part of the notification law in New
Jersey. We studied the effect of each of these 18 policy interventions on the prob-
ability of screening mammography follow-up separately. Even though the summary
law in Illinois aimed to increase the awareness of breast density among the general
public similar to the notification laws, we did not analyze the effect of the law in
Illinois because it did not explicitly require notification of patients. The Institutional
Review Board at Boston University Medical Center determined that the research did
not meet the definition of human subject research (IRB number: H-35095).
2.2.1 Study design
The study is a compilation of 18 individual analyses, one for each state that imple-
mented a notification law before the end of 2014. For each policy intervention, the
study was designed as a series of pre-post monthly cross-sections (Shadish, Cook,
and Campbell 2001; Trochim, Donnelly, and Arora 2015) of screening mammogra-
phy procedures. For each state, other than California and Hawaii, we established
a non-equivalent reference using monthly cross-sections from all neighboring states
that did not implement any form of legislation regarding dense breast tissue before
the end of 2014. The reference states for each intervention state are listed in Table
2.1. We were unable to establish a reference for California and Hawaii; all states
neighboring California implemented a notification law before the end of 2014, and
Hawaii did not have an appropriate geographic reference. Moreover, because the
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Table 2.1: List of reference states
Intervention state Reference states
AL FL, GA, MS
AZ NM
CA -
CT MA
HI -
MD DE, WV
MN IA, ND, SD, WI
NC SC
NJ DE
NV ID
NY MA, VT
OR ID, WA
PA DE, OH, WV
RI MA
TN AR, GA, KY, MO, MS
TX AR, LA, NM, OK
UT CO, ID, WY
VA KY, WV
Notes: All states neighboring California (AZ, NV, OR) implemented a notification
law before the end of 2014, and Hawaii did not have an appropriate geographic
reference.
health care system and the social environment in New York City (NYC) is unique
and the pattern of screening mammography follow-up by ultrasound or MRI in NYC
was very different from the rest of the New York State, we excluded NYC from the
analysis of the rest of New York State and analyzed it separately.
The pre-intervention period was defined as the interval since the beginning of
2007 until each state-specific policy came into effect. The shortest pre-intervention
period consisted of the 33 months before October 1, 2009, when the first notification
law was enacted in Connecticut. The post-intervention period was defined as the
2-year interval since each state-specific policy came into effect or the end of 2014,
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whichever came first. We capped the post-intervention period because most women
return for screening mammography within two years and repetitive notifications of
dense breast tissue probably would not provide them with any new information.
Arizona and Rhode Island had the shortest post-intervention period as these two
states enacted notification law legislation on October 1, 2013.
Each monthly cross-section of screening mammography procedures consisted of
different individuals. Arguably, each patient had different personal histories, health
beliefs, literacy levels, financial situations, and even breast density. Furthermore,
there are many clinically justified reasons why women return for follow-up imaging
after screening mammography. It is possible that the screening mammography result
was indeterminate and the patient was recalled for supplemental testing by another
imaging modality. Alternatively, it is possible that the screening mammography was
negative, but the patient later developed a breast mass causing understandable con-
cern. Technology adoption by local health care providers also may lead to increased
utilization of post-mammography breast imaging.
Other than patient age, we did not analyze patient-level or provider-level charac-
teristics. Instead, we analyzed monthly rates of mammography follow-up in the pre-
and post-intervention period to capture the overall systemic change. We argue that
the patient-level and local provider-level characteristics usually do not change drasti-
cally within a short period and thus should not confound our estimates. Such a strong
quasi-experimental design approximated the causal effect of the policy while control-
ling for secular trends and events influencing the regional markets or the market in
its entirety. Nevertheless, our final results are best expressed as strong associations
building from longitudinal methods that account for the implementation time of the
notification laws.
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2.2.2 Study period
The study period was from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2014. The first
notification law came into effect in October 2009 in Connecticut. A total of 18
states enacted notification laws during the study period.
2.2.3 Setting
We studied the effect of notification laws on supplemental breast imaging in each
state that implemented it during the study period. We used additional 23 states that
did not implement any legislation regarding dense breast tissue nor required health
plans to pay for supplemental imaging during the study period as a non-equivalent
reference. The reference states are listed in Table 2.1.
2.2.4 Subjects
The study subjects were women aged 40-64 years that resided in the United States,
were enrolled in a private health insurance plan, and received screening mammogra-
phy during the study period. Women younger than 40 years usually receive screening
mammography only if they are at high risk for breast cancer due to genetic charac-
teristics or family history.
2.2.5 Intervention
The studied intervention was the implementation of a notification law. The legisla-
tion itself does not guarantee that a woman who underwent screening mammography
would necessarily receive the notification. Receipt of a notification is conditional on
the assessment of the patient’s breast density, provider compliance with the legisla-
tion, and other factors such as the availability of the patient’s current contact in-
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formation. On the other hand, providers could have been sending notifications even
without the prompt of a notification law. Thus, for purposes of this study, we assume
that the implementation of a notification law increased the likelihood that a patient
would receive a breast density notification compared to before the implementation.
In other words, the study was conducted as an intent-to-treat analysis.
2.2.6 Outcome measures
We considered two supplemental breast-imaging modalities that were most likely to
be performed downstream to a screening mammogram due to the limitations posed by
dense breast tissue: ultrasound and MRI. We did not consider breast tomosynthesis.
Although the use of breast tomosynthesis was approved in 2011, the corresponding
billing code was not created until 2015. Thus, we were not able to identify digital
breast tomosynthesis procedures in claims data.
Receipt of a dense breast tissue notification is conditional on undergoing screen-
ing mammography. Therefore, we measured the outcome as an indicator of whether
supplemental breast imaging followed a screening mammography procedure within
a certain time interval. This interval had to be wide enough to allow the patient
to receive the notification together with a mammogram report and to have time to
contact her health care provider to schedule a follow-up appointment. On the other
hand, the interval could not be too wide. For example, the current recommenda-
tion for women with more than a 20% lifetime risk of breast cancer is to alternate
screening mammography with breast MRI every 6 months. Therefore, the interval
to seek follow-up breast imaging after screening mammography could not be wider
than 6 months to avoid capturing clinically justified use of imaging. The greater
availability of ultrasounds compared to MRI means that scheduling a supplemental
27
ultrasound is often easier than scheduling an MRI. Therefore, we balanced our anal-
ysis such that we used a 30-day interval for breast ultrasound and a 60-day interval
for MRI to define the main outcome measures of our study:
• Indicator whether a patient who underwent screening mammography also re-
ceived breast ultrasound within 30 days
• Indicator whether a patient who underwent screening mammography also re-
ceived breast MRI within 60 days.
We considered interval lengths of 14, 30, 60 and 90 days for both imaging modalities
in a sensitivity analysis.
2.2.7 Data
We used data on health care utilization from the Truven Health MarketScan® Com-
mercial Claims and Encounters Databases for years 2007-2014, which contain health
care claims from large employer-sponsored health plans across the United States.
We identified screening mammography procedures received by women aged 40-64
years using relevant screening mammography Current Procedural Terminology®
(CPT) code 77057 and Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS)
code G0202. For each encounter, we identified whether it was followed by breast ul-
trasound (CPT code 76645) or breast MRI (CPT code 77058 or 77059). We excluded
patients who discontinued their health plan enrollment during the interval in which
we sought follow-up breast imaging. Furthermore, for each patient, we recorded age,
health plan type, state and the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) of residence.
The state-specific dates of the notification law implementation were obtained from
published literature (Dehkordy and Carlos 2013) and our own review of each state’s
enacted bills.
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2.2.8 Statistical approach
To quantify the effect of each policy intervention on the probability of screening
mammography follow-up by supplemental imaging, we estimated a set of models for
each state s that implemented a notification law before the end of 2014, modality
m ∈ {ultrasound, MRI}, and time interval q ∈ {14, 30, 60, 90 days}. First, for each
state s except for Arizona, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, we started with a simple
model specification
logit (E [Yismq|Xismq]) = β0,smq + β1,smqTi + β2,smqIDBNis + β3,smqTDBNis (2.1)
where Yismq is the binary outcome whether screening mammography i performed on
a patient residing in state s was followed by supplemental imaging by modality m
within a time interval of q days; IDBNis is a binary indicator of whether a dense breast
notification (DBN) law had been implemented in state s at the time of screening
mammography i; Ti denotes the month sequence at the time of screening mammog-
raphy i since January 2007 - the beginning of the study period; and TDBNis denotes the
month sequence at the time of screening mammography i since the time a notification
law had been implemented in state s. Vector Xismq represents all covariates used
in the right-hand side of the equation. The variable T was included in the model
to capture the overall longitudinal trend of screening mammography follow-up by
supplemental imaging. The parameters associated with variables IDBN and TDBN
captured the effect of the policy intervention.
Second, we expanded the model specification with fixed effects for known and
29
observed potential confounders and estimated models
logit (E [Yismq|Xismq]) = β0,smq + β1,smqTi + β2,smqIDBNis + β3,smqTDBNis +
+β4,smq (Ai − 40) + ζsmq + φsmq (2.2)
where Ai is the patient’s age in years at the time of screening mammography i;
ζ denotes fixed effects for health plan type; and φ denotes fixed effects for MSA of
patient’s residence. We subtracted the sample minimum patient age of 40 years from
the age A variable that was included in the model for the estimated intercept to be
meaningful. Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), the largest health plan type
category in our sample, served as the reference category for health plan type ζ.
Third, we estimated models without the fixed effects for health plan type ζ and
MSA of patient’s residence φ
logit (E [Yismq|Xismq]) = β0,smq + β1,smqTi + β2,smqIDBNis + β3,smqTDBNis +
+β4,smt (Ai − 40) (2.3)
with standard errors that reflected hierarchical clustering of patients by health plan
type (Gatsonis 2005).
Because the notification laws in Arizona, Minnesota, and Rhode Island came into
effect in the second half of 2013, the post-intervention period was shorter than in
other analyzed states. Therefore, we estimated models analogous to (2.1)–(2.3), but
without the variable TDBN that would capture the change in the trend of screening
mammography follow-up after the implementation of the notification law. In other
words, the effect of the policy intervention was captured only by the parameter
associated with the indicator IDBN.
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Next, we added a reference group to each model to control for any events in-
fluencing the regional markets or the market in its entirety. A reference group for
state s consisted of screening mammography procedures performed on women from
the study sample that resided in any state neighboring state s that did not implement
any legislation regarding dense breast tissue during the study period. Because Hawaii
had no neighboring reference state and all neighbors of California implemented a no-
tification law during the study period, we used only the previously discussed models
(2.1)–(2.3) to estimate the effect of the notification law on the probability of screen-
ing mammography follow-up by supplemental imaging in these two states. For all
other states, except for Arizona, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, we estimated an
analogue of model (2.1) with a non-equivalent reference
logit (E [Yismq|Xismq]) = β0,smq + β1,smqIDBN stateis +
+β2,smqTi + β3,smq IDBN stateis × Ti +
+β4,smqIDBNis + β5,smq IDBN stateis × IDBNis +
+β6,smqT
DBN
is + β7,smq IDBN stateis × TDBNis (2.4)
where IDBN stateis is a binary indicator of whether screening mammography i was per-
formed on a patient who at that time resided in state s that enacted a notification
law at some point during the study period. Furthermore, we estimated a model with
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fixed effects for the patient’s age, health plan type and MSA of residence,
logit (E [Yismq|Xismq]) = β0,smq + β1,smqIDBN stateis +
+β2,smqTi + β3,smq IDBN stateis × Ti +
+β4,smqIDBNis + β5,smq IDBN stateis × IDBNis +
+β6,smqT
DBN
is + β7,smq IDBN stateis × TDBNis
+β8,smq (Ai − 40) + ζsmq + φsmq (2.5)
an analogue of model (2.2) with a non-equivalent reference group, and finally a model
with standard errors that reflected hierarchical clustering of patients by health plan
type,
logit (E [Yismq|Xismq]) = β0,smq + β1,smqIDBN stateis +
+β2,smtTi + β3,smq IDBN stateis × Ti +
+β4,smqIDBNis + β5,smq IDBN stateis × IDBNis +
+β6,smqT
DBN
is + β7,smq IDBN stateis × TDBNis
+β8,smq (Ai − 40) (2.6)
an analogue to model (2.3). For Arizona, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, we removed
the month sequence TDBN and its interaction terms from models (2.4)–(2.6).
All analyses were performed using the SAS software, version 9.4 (SAS Institute
Inc. 2012); figures were generated using the statistical software R, version 3.3.1 (R
Core Team 2016). Throughout the analysis, we reported the level of statistical
significance using p < 0.05.
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2.2.9 Supplemental analysis
The enacted notification laws targeted the practice of health care providers, rather
than patients. However, our data contained information about the location of service
provision only for years 2007–2010. Therefore, we had to approximate this informa-
tion with the location of each patient’s residence, which was available for all claims.
We used the 2007–2010 data to perform a supplemental analysis to determine how
many patients resided in the same state where they received screening mammog-
raphy. The main analysis, however, used the information about the beneficiary’s
residence to approximate whether the patient should have received the notification
if she had dense breast tissue.
2.3 Results
The study sample comprised 20,640,576 screening mammography procedures deli-
vered to 11,086,143 distinct women aged 40–64 years, who resided in one of the
18 intervention states or one of the 23 reference states. Table 2.2 describes the
demographic information of the sample. Sample size by state and period is described
in Supplementary Table A.1. For each state that implemented a notification law
before 2014 except for California and Hawaii, we found at least one neighboring
state that did not implement any form of legislation regarding dense breast tissue
during the study period to serve as a non-equivalent reference (Table 2.1).
2.3.1 Ultrasound
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the unadjusted screening mammography follow-up rate
by breast ultrasound within 30 days in states that implemented a notification law
before the end of 2014 and in reference states, respectively. The key estimates of
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Figure 2.1: The unadjusted screening mammography follow-up rate by breast ultra-
sound within 30 days in states that implemented a notification law before the end of
2014
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Figure 2.2: The unadjusted screening mammography follow-up rate by breast ultra-
sound within 30 days in reference states
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of the study sample
N or Mean % or SD
Number of women aged 40–64 11,086,143
Number of screening mammography procedures 20,640,576
Age at screening mammography 51.9 (6.8)
Health plan type
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 12,454,709 60.3%
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) 3,057,810 14.8%
Point-of-Service (POS) 1,830,397 8.9%
Consumer-directed (CDHP) 946,165 4.6%
High Deductible (HDHP) 517,942 2.5%
Comprehensive 425,365 2.1%
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) 377,754 1.8%
unknown 1,030,434 5.0%
State of residence Reported in Table A.1
the state-specific models, the immediate change in level and the change in trend of
the probability of screening mammography follow-up by ultrasound within 30 days,
are summarized in Table 2.3. The estimates, except for California, Hawaii, and New
York City, were obtained from state-specific models with specification (2.6) adjusted
for a secular time trend, trends in the neighboring reference states, and patient age.
The estimates for California, Hawaii, and New York City were obtained from state-
specific models with specification (2.3) adjusted for a secular time trend and patient
age. Standard errors were calculated based on clustering of individuals by health
plan type.
In most states, implementation of a notification law led to a significant increase
in level, but no significant change in the trend of the probability of ultrasound follow-
up. In contrast, the legislation in Oregon had no statistically significant immediate
influence on the level of the follow-up probability, but increased its trend (OR = 1.03
per month, p = 0.036). We found a similar effect on the trend of the probability
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Table 2.3: Key estimates of the adjusted effect of notification laws on the probability
of screening mammography follow-up by breast ultrasound within 30 days by state
Adjusted Adjusted
follow-up follow-up
State Par. Est. SE OR p-value before after
AL
∆ level 0.449 0.052 1.57 < .001
5.7% 8.4%
∆ trend −0.012 0.007 0.99 0.079
AZ
∆ level 0.083 0.040 1.09 0.037
7.2% 6.6%
∆ trend n/a n/a n/a n/a
CA
∆ level 0.200 0.036 1.22 < .001
6.7% 8.1%
∆ trend −0.003 0.001 1.00 < .001
CT
∆ level 0.190 0.052 1.21 < .001
11.8% 14.5%
∆ trend 0.010 0.003 1.01 0.001
HI
∆ level 0.499 0.293 1.65 0.089
8.2% 12.8%
∆ trend −0.060 0.031 0.94 0.058
MD
∆ level 0.031 0.078 1.03 0.687
7.2% 7.3%
∆ trend 0.012 0.007 1.01 0.082
MN
∆ level 0.184 0.088 1.20 0.036
5.5% 6.2%
∆ trend n/a n/a n/a n/a
NC
∆ level 0.179 0.017 1.20 < .001
5.1% 6.2%
∆ trend 0.003 0.004 1.00 0.36
NJ
∆ level 0.748 0.060 2.11 < .001
14.3% 18.0%
∆ trend −0.020 0.014 0.98 0.15
NV
∆ level 0.195 0.070 1.22 0.005
5.8% 7.8%
∆ trend −0.012 0.008 0.99 0.14
NY City
∆ level −0.396 0.336 0.67 0.24
33.3% 25.5%
∆ trend −0.008 0.004 0.99 0.059
NY State
∆ level 0.307 0.167 1.36 0.066
21.1% 26.1%
∆ trend 0.000 0.004 1.00 0.99
OR
∆ level 0.002 0.116 1.00 0.99
6.4% 7.1%
∆ trend 0.026 0.013 1.03 0.036
PA
∆ level 0.203 0.037 1.23 < .001
7.5% 9.5%
∆ trend 0.008 0.004 1.01 0.026
RI
∆ level 0.568 0.158 1.76 < .001
5.9% 9.9%
∆ trend n/a n/a n/a n/a
TN
∆ level 0.163 0.057 1.18 0.004
7.2% 9.0%
∆ trend 0.010 0.007 1.01 0.17
TX
∆ level 0.220 0.032 1.25 < .001
6.6% 7.6%
∆ trend 0.005 0.001 1.01 < .001
Table continues on the next page.
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Adjusted Adjusted
follow-up follow-up
State Par. Est. SE OR p-value before after
UT
∆ level 0.048 0.065 1.05 0.46
6.8% 7.2%
∆ trend 0.007 0.002 1.01 0.006
VA
∆ level 0.136 0.034 1.15 < .001
6.8% 8.1%
∆ trend −0.002 0.003 1.00 0.60
Notes: All models controlled for a secular trend and patient’s age. All models, ex-
cept for those of California, Hawaii, and New York City, were adjusted for changes in
screening mammography follow-up by breast ultrasound within 30 days in neighbor-
ing states that did not implement a notification law. Standard errors were calculated
based on clustering of individuals by health plan type. The adjusted probability of
follow-up before and after the policy intervention was estimated for a 50-year-old
patient. A complete set of the estimated parameters is reported in Appendix A.
of ultrasound follow-up in Utah (OR = 1.01 per month, p = 0.006), where the
legislation only suggests, but does not mandate, sending a notification to patients.
Furthermore, the effect of a notification law on the probability of ultrasound follow-
up was positive and relatively large in Hawaii (OR = 1.65, p = 0.089) and New
York State outside of New York City (OR = 1.36, p = 0.066), but in neither of
these states it reached the conventional level of statistical significance. Our analysis
demonstrated no effect of the policy on the probability of follow-up by ultrasound in
Maryland.
Table 2.3 also shows the adjusted risk of screening mammography follow-up by
ultrasound within 30 days during the month right before and the month right after
the policy went into effect in each state. The adjusted risk of follow-up before and
after the intervention was estimated for a 50-year-old patient residing in the particu-
lar state. In most states, the pre-intervention 30-day follow-up risk ranged from 4.9
to 7.5 percent. However, the baseline follow-up risk was much higher in Connecti-
cut (11.8%), New Jersey (14.3%), and New York (21.1%). The implementation of
notification laws led to an increase in the probability of follow-up by ultrasound by
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roughly 1 to 5 percentage points.
A complete set of our estimates of the effect of notification laws on screening mam-
mography follow-up by breast ultrasound in Alabama is reported in Supplementary
Tables A.2–A.5. Those include estimates of models with each of the considered spe-
cifications (2.1)–(2.3), and, when appropriate, (2.4)–(2.6), as well as the estimates of
models using different widths of the follow-up window ranging from 14 to 90 days.
The sensitivity analyses supported that our estimates were robust to changes in the
width of the follow-up interval, model specification, clustering of patients, as well as
to whether the models controlled for changes in the follow-up rates in neighboring
reference states. A full set of the estimated models for the other analyzed states is
available by request from the author.
2.3.2 Magnetic resonance imaging
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the unadjusted screening mammography follow-up rate
by breast MRI within 60 days in states that implemented a notification law be-
fore the end of 2014 and in reference states, respectively. The key estimates of the
state-specific models, the immediate change in level and the change in trend of the
probability of screening mammography follow-up by MRI within 60 days, are summa-
rized in Table 2.4. The estimates, except for Arizona, California, Hawaii, New York
City, and Rhode Island, were obtained from state-specific models with specification
(2.6) adjusted for a secular time trend, trends in the neighboring reference states,
and patient age. The estimates for California and New York City were obtained
from state-specific models with specification (2.3) adjusted for a secular time trend
and patient age. Standard errors were calculated based on clustering of individuals
by health plan type. We were not able to obtain reliable estimates for Arizona and
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Figure 2.3: The unadjusted screening mammography follow-up rate by breast MRI
within 60 days in states that implemented a notification law before the end of 2014
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Notes: Hawaii was not included due to the small number of breast MRI procedures.
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Figure 2.4: The unadjusted screening mammography follow-up rate by breast MRI
within 60 days in reference states
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Rhode Island due to the short post-intervention period in these two states, as well
as for Hawaii due to the small number of breast MRI encounters.
Implementation of a notification law increased the probability of screening mam-
mography follow-up by breast MRI within 60 days in California (OR = 1.25, p =
0.002), North Carolina (OR = 1.41, p < .001), and Pennsylvania (OR = 1.43,
p = 0.018). Our analysis also demonstrated an increased pace of the follow-up rate
in Texas (OR = 1.02 per month, p < .001). The estimated immediate effect of
the notification law on screening mammography follow-up by MRI in Maryland was
strong and negative (OR = 0.46, p = 0.006), but the increased pace (OR = 1.11,
p = 0.001) soon offset the drop. Our analysis demonstrated a significant decrease
in follow-up by MRI in New York City (OR = 0.69, p = 0.045). We found no sta-
tistically significant effect on the probability of breast MRI follow-up in any other
state.
A complete set of our estimates of the effect of notification laws on screening
mammography follow-up by breast MRI in Alabama is reported in Supplementary
Tables A.6–A.9. Those include estimates of models with each of the considered
specifications (2.1)–(2.3), and, when appropriate, (2.4)–(2.6), as well as the estimates
of models using different widths of the follow-up window ranging from 14 to 90 days.
These sensitivity analyses supported that our estimates were relatively robust to
changes in the width of the follow-up interval, model specification, clustering of
patients, as well as to whether the models controlled for changes in the follow-up
rates in neighboring reference states. A full set of the estimated models for the other
analyzed states is available by request from the author.
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Table 2.4: Key estimates of the adjusted effect of notification laws on the probability
of screening mammography follow-up by breast MRI within 60 days by state
Adjusted Adjusted
follow-up follow-up
State Par. Est. SE OR p-value before after
AL
∆ level 0.320 0.164 1.38 0.052
0.30% 0.41%
∆ trend −0.001 0.019 1.00 0.95
AZ
∆ level n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a
∆ trend n/a n/a n/a n/a
CA
∆ level 0.226 0.072 1.25 0.002
0.36% 0.45%
∆ trend 0.001 0.006 1.00 0.89
CT
∆ level 0.021 0.055 1.02 0.71
0.66% 0.64%
∆ trend 0.000 0.004 1.00 0.97
HI
∆ level n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a
∆ trend n/a n/a n/a n/a
MD
∆ level −0.784 0.284 0.46 0.006
0.42% 0.22%
∆ trend 0.103 0.032 1.11 0.001
MN
∆ level 0.553 0.389 1.74 0.16
0.36% 0.45%
∆ trend n/a n/a n/a n/a
NC
∆ level 0.342 0.089 1.41 < .001
0.23% 0.28%
∆ trend −0.020 0.017 0.98 0.24
NJ
∆ level 0.586 0.425 1.8 0.17
0.56% 0.61%
∆ trend −0.060 0.096 0.94 0.53
NV
∆ level −0.641 1.327 0.53 0.63
0.22% 0.16%
∆ trend 0.036 0.182 1.04 0.84
NY City
∆ level −0.371 0.185 0.69 0.045
0.65% 0.45%
∆ trend −0.003 0.007 1.00 0.67
NY State
∆ level 0.212 0.176 1.24 0.23
0.69% 0.76%
∆ trend 0.001 0.012 1.00 0.93
OR
∆ level 0.001 0.317 1.00 0.99
0.28% 0.37%
∆ trend 0.100 0.053 1.11 0.057
PA
∆ level 0.357 0.151 1.43 0.018
0.41% 0.50%
∆ trend −0.001 0.022 1.00 0.97
RI
∆ level n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a
∆ trend n/a n/a n/a n/a
TN
∆ level 0.220 0.156 1.25 0.16
0.45% 0.57%
∆ trend −0.042 0.032 0.96 0.19
TX
∆ level −0.019 0.050 0.98 0.71
0.25% 0.25%
∆ trend 0.024 0.002 1.02 < .001
Table continues on the next page.
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Adjusted Adjusted
follow-up follow-up
State Par. Est. SE OR p-value before after
UT
∆ level 0.267 0.186 1.31 0.15
0.30% 0.37%
∆ trend 0.009 0.016 1.01 0.56
VA
∆ level 0.154 0.098 1.17 0.12
0.51% 0.56%
∆ trend 0.002 0.008 1.00 0.80
Notes: All models controlled for a secular trend and patient’s age. All models,
except for those of California, Hawaii, and New York City, were adjusted for changes
in screening mammography follow-up by breast MRI within 60 days in neighboring
states that did not implement a notification law. Standard errors were calculated
based on clustering of individuals by health plan type. The adjusted probability of
follow-up before and after the policy intervention was estimated for a 50-year-old
patient. A complete set of the estimated parameters is reported in Appendix A.
2.3.3 Supplemental analysis
From 2007 to 2010, our sample contained 10,265,216 screening mammography proce-
dures. For 8,750,255 of them (85.2%), the state of the patient’s residence correspon-
ded to the state of the screening mammography provision; for other 854,725 (8.3%)
procedures it did not; and for the remaining 660,236 (6.4%) procedures, the state of
screening mammography provision was unknown. The distribution of states by the
proportion of screening mammography procedures performed in a state other than
the beneficiary’s state of residence is described in Figure 2.5.
2.4 Discussion
We tested whether notification laws affected the probability of screening mammogra-
phy follow-up by ultrasound and MRI in each of the 18 states that had implemented
the legislation before the end of 2014. We found that implementation of a notifica-
tion law was associated with a statistically significant increase in the probability of
downstream breast imaging, although the effect size varied. Specifically, we found an
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of screening mammography provision state by patients’ state
of residence
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increased probability of breast ultrasound within 30 days of screening mammogra-
phy in all states that implemented a notification law before 2014 except for Hawaii,
Maryland, and New York. We also found that implementation of a notification law
was associated with a statistically significant increase in the probability of a breast
MRI within 60 days of screening mammography in California, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, and Texas.
The intended purpose of the policy was to inform patients about their breast
density and the limitations of mammography in identifying cancer in dense breast
tissue. Ideally, such legislation would promote more meaningful communication bet-
ween providers and patients. However, the lack of evidence makes such discussions
both complicated and highly variable with regard to content. Even though the utility
of supplemental imaging based solely on breast density is not substantiated in the
clinical literature (Kerlikowske, Zhu, et al. 2015), many physicians may find it easier
to offer supplemental breast imaging to patients, rather than engage in complicated
conversations about the risks of false positive and false negative errors in imaging,
thereby mitigating malpractice liability concerns.
Across the nation, state-level notification law initiatives have sparked heated de-
bates among health care providers, health researchers, and patient advocates mainly
because their origin was based on anecdotal evidence. So far, only a few studies have
explored the effect of notification laws on downstream utilization of supplemental
breast imaging by ultrasound or MRI. Two single-site studies from New Jersey re-
ported a substantial increase in the use of breast ultrasounds following the enactment
of that state’s notification and insurance law. Sobotka and Hinrichs (2015) studied
the use of breast ultrasounds within several months after screening mammography
and found an increase in follow-up rates from 17.6% pre-legislation to approximately
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42.2% post-legislation. Their reported baseline follow-up rate aligns with our find-
ings of a relatively high follow-up rate in New Jersey compared to most other states.
However, their study was based on a sample from only a single regional medical
center in northwest New Jersey and lacks a clear definition of the post-screening
mammography interval for follow-up imaging. The other study focusing on legis-
lation in New Jersey assessed only the absolute utilization rates of supplemental
imaging by ultrasound and MRI (Sanders, King, and Goodman 2016) and suffered
from similar limitations.
This study is the first to investigate the effect of notification laws on the utilization
of supplemental breast cancer imaging in all states implementing laws before the
end of 2014. Compared to previous studies, ours used a large health care claims
database that included services provided at various locations throughout each state.
Our longitudinal design also allowed us to control for secular trends due to factors
such as variable adoption of different imaging technologies. Furthermore, the use of
neighboring states that did not implement the legislation as non-equivalent references
for most intervention states allowed us to control for any changes affecting regional
markets or the market in its entirety.
Only patients who underwent screening mammography could receive a dense
breast tissue notification. Although some studies suggested that the change in the
USPSTF breast cancer screening recommendation in 2009 did not have a perceptible
impact on the patterns of screening mammography age at initiation (Dehkordy, Hall,
et al. 2015), a change in screening mammography utilization trends would arguably
affect the absolute utilization rate of supplemental breast imaging. We minimized the
chance that our results would be confounded by changes in the screening mammog-
raphy utilization rate over time by measuring the utilization of supplemental breast
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imaging as a proportion of screening mammography procedures that were followed
up by supplemental imaging within a certain period.
The heterogeneous effect of notification laws on the probability of screening mam-
mography follow-up by supplemental imaging across states demonstrated by this
study may be explained by small area variations, unmeasured confounding factors,
or the different aspects of the local legislation. Legislation aspects include the re-
quirement to suggest that the patient may benefit from supplemental testing or
the requirement that health plans pay for the supplemental imaging. An analy-
sis of whether the varying aspects of the legislation regarding dense breast tissue
can explain the heterogeneous effect on supplemental breast imaging across states is
presented in Chapter 3.
2.4.1 Limitations
Our study had several limitations. First, observational studies are inherently limited
in their ability to make causal inferences. It is conceivable that some unknown
factors caused the observed increase in ultrasound and MRI follow-up to screening
mammography at the very same time that a notification law came into effect in
a particular state. We argue, however, that it would be quite unlikely to observe
an associated immediate increase in follow-up, especially by ultrasound, in almost
all states that implemented a notification law, given that many states enacted their
laws at different times.
Second, we could not be completely certain that all patients with dense breast
tissue residing in states that had implemented a notification law had actually received
notifications, owing to factors such as health care providers’ variable compliance with
enacted laws or operational issues related to notification delivery. For the purposes
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of this study, we assumed that health care providers complied with each state’s
legislation on the day it went into effect, if not before, and that any operational issues
with notification delivery were minimal. If patients were not receiving notifications,
we likely would have found no effect of notification laws on supplemental imaging
utilization. Additionally, it is conceivable that providers in states with notification
laws could have been sending breast density notifications even before the legislation
came into effect, as could providers in states with no notification laws, owing to
liability concerns (Marcus and Yepes 2013). Given the controversial nature of such
notifications within the physician community, however, we believe that this was quite
unlikely. Even if this hypothesis were true, the effect of the legislation documented
in our results would underestimate the true effect.
Third, because we relied on claims data, and did not have access to clinical
records, we had no information about the assessment of individual patients’ breast
density. Although radiologists differ in their determinations of patient breast density
(Sprague, Conant, et al. 2016), which impacts which patients receive notifications,
we are not aware of any indication that this variation changes across state lines.
Moreover, even if state-level variation of breast density assessment variability were to
exist, it has been well documented that an individual patient’s breast density usually
does not change sharply over a short period (Cohen et al. 2014). The distribution of
breast density within a population should, therefore, stay relatively constant shortly
before and after the implementation of the new policy unless radiologists somehow
dramatically changed their clinical reporting behavior and began assessing breast
density differently immediately when legislation in their individual states came into
effect.
Fourth, because our data did not always contain information regarding the state
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in which the screening mammography provider was located, we had to approximate
this information using each patient’s state of residence. Analysis on a subset of our
data that contained provider locations revealed that about 85% of procedures were
performed in the same state as the patient’s residence. The remaining procedures
that were performed in a state other than the patient’s residence moderated the
observed effect. Therefore, our results can be potential underestimates.
Fifth, many states with notification laws did not mandate health insurance plans
to pay for supplemental testing. It is thus likely that many health plans in these
states did not include supplemental imaging procedures in their covered benefits.
Patients with such plans could have requested a breast ultrasound or breast MRI,
for which they would have had to pay out-of-pocket. Because our data contained only
adjudicated claims, any such procedures paid directly by patients were not captured
in our data.
Finally, although the MarketScan® Research Databases contain health care claims
of approximately one-third of all privately insured individuals in the United States,
the sample is not fully representative of this population. It also does not represent the
Medicaid and Medicare populations, or the uninsured population. Implementation
of notification laws may have had a different effect on Medicaid beneficiaries due to
a more significant personal financial burden compared to the privately insured popu-
lation, or due to an overall lower literacy level among Medicaid beneficiaries (Kressin,
Gunn, and Battaglia 2016). Thus, further research is needed to understand the im-
pact of notification laws on other populations not included in our sample.
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Chapter 3
Characteristics of state policies and their
impact on health care delivery: A study
of legislation regarding dense breast tissue
Although it is rare for a state government to become directly involved in mandat-
ing particular aspects of health care delivery, sometimes states become involved due
to public pressure, most often from vocal interest groups (Contandriopoulos 2011;
Grossmann 2012). The degree of the government’s involvement may range from sim-
ply providing information at one extreme to mandating certain behaviors or practices
at the other extreme. The case study in this paper evaluates the impact of state
actions along this range regarding screening mammography follow-up by breast ul-
trasound – the modality most likely to be performed downstream to a screening
mammogram demonstrating dense breast tissue.
3.1 Research objective
The study in Chapter 2 revealed a strong association between the implementation
of notification laws and increased screening mammography follow-up by a breast ul-
trasound in almost all states that implemented these laws before the end of 2014.
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The effect, however, was not homogeneous across states. A possible explanation of
this finding is that the enacted notification laws varied in several characteristics by
state. The objective of this study is to identify the specific characteristics of the
various state-level policies regarding dense breast tissue including not only the noti-
fication laws (i.e., a mandate that health care providers notify patients about their
assessed breast density classification and to provide them with information about
the increased risk of breast cancer associated with dense breast tissue) but also the
summary law (i.e., a mandate that the state’s Department of Public Health “pub-
lishes, in layman’s language, a standardized written summary outlining methods for
the early detection and diagnosis of breast cancer”) and insurance laws (i.e., a man-
date that health insurance plans include supplemental screening options in covered
benefits) that were associated with increased follow-up use of breast ultrasounds.
3.1.1 Hypotheses
• Implementation of a notification law with a mandate to notify patients about
the issues surrounding breast density is associated with a larger increase in the
probability of a breast ultrasound follow-up compared to implementation of
a notification law that suggests, but does not require, notification of patients.
• Implementation of a notification law with a mandate to notify all women who
underwent screening mammography about the issues surrounding increased
breast density is associated with a larger increase in the probability of a breast
ultrasound follow-up compared to implementation of a notification law with
a mandate to notify only women whose mammogram showed heterogeneously
dense or extremely dense breast tissue.
• Implementation of a notification law with a requirement to explicitly suggest
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that a patient might benefit from supplemental imaging by a breast ultrasound
is associated with a larger increase in the probability of a breast ultrasound
follow-up compared to implementation of a notification law without such a re-
quirement.
• Implementation of a summary law is associated with an increase in the proba-
bility of a breast ultrasound follow-up compared to the previous period.
• Implementation of an insurance law is associated with an increase in the pro-
bability of a breast ultrasound follow-up compared to the previous period.
• Implementation of a notification law together with an insurance law is associ-
ated with a larger increase in the probability of a breast ultrasound follow-up
compared to implementation of a notification law alone.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Study design
This study, similar to the study in Chapter 2, was designed as a series of pre-post
monthly cross-sections (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2001; Trochim, Donnelly, and
Arora 2015) of screening mammography procedures. We analyzed the probability
of mammography follow-up in the pre- and post-intervention period to capture the
overall systemic changes. Other than patient age, we did not include any patient-
level or provider-level characteristics in the analysis. We argue that the patient-level
and local provider-level characteristics on the population level usually do not change
drastically within a short period and thus should not confound our estimates.
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3.2.2 Study period
The study period was from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2014. The first
insurance law came into effect in Connecticut in 2005. Therefore, we were not able
to assess the effect of the introduction of the law in this state. However, the next
state policy regarding dense breast tissue was an insurance law in Illinois, which was
implemented in 2008. Thus, the only law regarding dense breast tissue our analysis
missed was the insurance law in Connecticut.
3.2.3 Setting
A total of 20 states (Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia) imple-
mented some form of legislation regarding dense breast tissue identified at the time
of screening mammography before the end of 2014. During the study period, 16
states enacted a notification law without an insurance law, 1 state (Connecticut)
added a notification law to its preexisting insurance law, 1 state (New Jersey) en-
acted a notification law together with an insurance law, 2 states (Illinois and Indiana)
enacted an insurance law without a notification law, and 1 state (Illinois) later added
a summary law to its preexisting insurance law.
3.2.4 Subjects
We studied the use of downstream breast ultrasounds among privately insured women
aged 40-64 years, who underwent screening mammography between 2007 and 2014,
and who resided in a U.S. state that had implemented relevant legislation during
the same period. Demographic information of the study sample is described in Table
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3.2. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Boston University
Medical Center (IRB number: H-35095).
3.2.5 Intervention
We identified characteristics of each of the enacted state policies from the published
literature (Dehkordy and Carlos 2013; Kressin, Gunn, and Battaglia 2016) and our
own review of the enacted bills. For each law, we specifically focused on:
1. The required means of improving awareness of breast tissue density and its
impact on the sensitivity of screening mammography
2. The definition of the targeted population to be educated about breast tissue
density
3. Whether a notification must explicitly suggest that patients might benefit from
supplemental breast cancer testing
4. Whether health plans were required to cover expenses associated with supple-
mental imaging.
Different combinations of characteristics allowed us to group the enacted policies into
9 clusters, Policy A–Policy I, defined in Table 3.1. Policies A–G represent different
designs of a notification law in some cases complemented by an insurance law ; Policy
H represents the summary law in Illinois added in 2014 to an already implemented
insurance law ; and finally Policy I represents the insurance law enacted before im-
plementation of a policy aiming to increase awareness of breast tissue density.
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3.2.6 Outcome measures
The main measured outcome in this study was an indicator of whether a patient
who underwent screening mammography also received a breast ultrasound within 30
days, similar to one of the main outcomes in the study in chapter 2. We varied the
follow-up interval length at 14, 30, 60 and 90 days in a sensitivity analysis.
3.2.7 Data
We extracted data on health care utilization from the Truven Health MarketScan®
Commercial Claims Database for the period of 2007 to 2014 – a large sample of health
care claims compiled from major employer-sponsored health plans across the United
States. We identified screening mammography procedures received by women aged
40-64 years using screening mammography CPT code 77057 and HCPCS code G0202;
and for each encounter, we identified whether it was followed by a breast ultrasound
(CPT code 76645) within the four defined intervals. We excluded patients who
discontinued their health plan enrollment during the interval in which we sought
follow-up breast imaging. Furthermore, for each patient, we recorded age, health
plan type, state and the MSA of residence.
If a patient had had more than one screening mammography encounter in the
period following implementation of a policy regarding dense breast tissue in her
state of residence, we included only the first encounter because that most likely was
when the patient received information about breast tissue density. For the same
reason, we also excluded all encounters that occurred more than two years after
policy implementation because most women returning for screening mammography
do so every one to two years. Finally, we matched characteristics of the individual
legislation to each screening mammography encounter based on the patient’s state
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of residence, the date of screening mammography, and the date when the particular
laws came into effect.
3.2.8 Statistical approach
The longitudinal nature of our data allowed us to use logistic regression models for
screening mammography follow-up by a breast ultrasound that controlled for secular
trends and accounted for the implementation time of the various laws. The main
independent variables of interest were specific characteristics of the state policies.
Before each law went into effect, indicators for each characteristic were all set to zero.
Because there were interactions between some policy characteristics, we estimated
three separate sets of models. First, we analyzed the characteristics of notification
laws in some cases complemented by an insurance law (Policies A–G). For each time
interval of q = {14, 30, 60, 90} days since screening mammography, we estimated
parameters of a logistic model
logit (E [Yiq|Xi]) = β0,q + β1,qIDBNi + β2,qIAlli + β3,qIOptionali + β4,qISuppl. imagingi +
+β5,qIInsurancei + β6,q
(
Ai − A¯
)
+ β7,qTi + ζq + φq (3.1)
where Yiq is a binary indicator of whether screening mammography i was followed by
a supplemental breast ultrasound imaging within time interval q; IDBN is an indica-
tor of whether a notification law had been enacted in the patient’s state of residence
at the time when the screening mammography i was performed; IAll is an indicator
of a policy that requires all women who undergo screening mammography receive
a notification regardless of their breast density classification (this indicator was set
to 0 if there was no notification law enacted in the patient’s state of residence at
the time of screening mammography, or if a notification law were enacted in the
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patient’s state of residence at the time of screening mammography but only women
with heterogeneously dense or extremely dense breast tissue were supposed to receive
a notification); IOptional is an indicator of a policy that suggests, but does not man-
date, the notification of patients about their breast density classification; ISuppl.imaging
is an indicator of a policy that requires an explicit mention that patients may ben-
efit from supplemental breast cancer testing by ultrasound; IInsurance is an indicator
of a policy that requires health plans cover expenses associated with supplemental
imaging; Ai represents a patient’s age at screening mammography; A¯ is the sample
mean of patient age at screening mammography; Ti denotes the month sequence at
the time of screening mammography i since January 2007 - the beginning of the study
period; ζ denotes fixed effects for health plan type; and φ denotes state fixed effects.
Vector Xi represents all covariates used in the right-hand side of the equation.
Second, we analyzed the summary law in Illinois (Policy H) that was enacted in
2014, when the insurance law had already been implemented. To capture the effect
of only the addition of the summary law to the already implemented insurance law,
we limited the study sample to screening mammography procedures performed after
January 1, 2008, the date when the insurance law was enacted in Illinois, on women
residing in the state of Illinois. For each time interval of q = {14, 30, 60, 90} days
since screening mammography, we estimated parameters of a logistic model
logit (E [Yiq|Xi]) = β0,q + β1,qISummaryi + β2,q
(
Ai − A¯
)
+
+β3,qTi + ζq (3.2)
where ISummary is an indicator of whether the summary law had been enacted at the
time of screening mammography.
Third, we analyzed the insurance law alone (Policy I); that is an implementation
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of a mandate for health insurance plans to cover expenses associated with supple-
mental imaging with no complementary policy aiming to increase awareness of breast
tissue density. To capture only the effect of the insurance law, we limited the study
sample to screening mammography procedures performed on women residing in the
states of Indiana and Illinois. For each time interval of q = {14, 30, 60, 90} days since
screening mammography, we estimated parameters of a logistic model
logit (E [Yiq|Xi]) = β0,q + β1,qIInsurancei + β2,q
(
Ai − A¯
)
+
+β3,qTi + ζq + φq (3.3)
Finally, we quantified the effect of each policy characteristic on the probability of
screening mammography follow-up by a breast ultrasound within q days on a relative
scale using odds ratios (OR) and on an absolute scale using risk differences (RD)
defined as the difference between the adjusted probability of follow-up after and
before the particular law came into effect. The analysis was performed using the
SAS software, version 9.4., SAS Institute Inc. 2012.
3.3 Results
The study sample comprised 13,481,554 screening mammography procedures deli-
vered to 7,716,830 distinct women aged 40–64 years, who resided in the 20 states
that implemented some form of legislation regarding dense breast tissue before the
end of 2014. Table 3.2 describes the demographic information of the sample. Figure
3.1 visualizes the change in the probability of follow-up imaging from the baseline
associated with implementation of laws regarding dense breast tissue in each state
that implemented the laws between 2007 and 2014. For better insight, individual
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the study sample
N or Mean % or SD
Number of distinct women 7,716,830
Number of screening mammography procedures 13,481,554
Age at screening mammography 51.8 (6.8)
40-49 years 5,300,473 39.3%
50-59 years 5,976,247 44.3%
60-64 years 2,204,834 16.4%
Health plan type
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 8,537,296 63.3%
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) 1,796,696 13.3%
Point-of-Service (POS) 1,001,141 7.4%
Consumer-directed (CDHP) 411,396 3.1%
High Deductible (HDHP) 321,178 2.4%
Comprehensive 294,219 2.2%
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) 289,962 2.2%
unknown 829,666 6.2%
effects were clustered by policy design.
Table 3.3 presents the estimated parameters of the logistic regression models for
screening mammography follow-up by a breast ultrasound within 30 days. Estimates
of models for different follow-up intervals (14, 60, and 90 days since screening mam-
mography) are reported in Supplementary Tables B.1–B.3 in the Appendix. Table
3.4 summarizes the estimated effects of each policy characteristic on the probability
of screening mammography follow-up by an ultrasound within 30 days. The baseline
probability of screening mammography follow-up by a breast ultrasound within 30
days in the period before implementation of dense breast tissue laws varied by state.
In most states, the baseline follow-up rate was between 5 and 7 percent. However,
that baseline follow-up rate was about 15 percent in Connecticut and New Jersey,
and about 18 percent in New York State.
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During the study period, 18 states enacted a notification law – a policy that either
mandated or suggested health care providers send women who underwent screening
mammography a notification informing them about breast tissue density and its
adverse impact on the diagnostic sensitivity of mammography (Policies A–G). For
purposes of interpretation of the results obtained from model (3.1), we define a “basic
notification law” as a policy with the following characteristics:
• Health care providers were mandated to send notifications
• The notifications were intended only for women with heterogeneously dense or
extremely dense breasts,
• The notifications did not have to mention that the patient might benefit from
supplemental breast cancer testing, and
• Health plans were not required to pay for supplemental imaging.
Implementation of a “basic notification law” was associated with an increased screen-
ing mammography follow-up by a breast ultrasound within 30 days by 1.02 percent-
age points (OR = 1.15, p < .001) compared to before the implementation of the law
in the same state.
If a particular policy mandated health care providers notify all women who un-
derwent screening mammography instead of only those with dense breasts, the effect
was weaker by 0.15 percentage points (OR = 0.98, p = 0.007) compared to the
effect of the “basic notification law.” In other words, such a policy was associated
with an increased follow-up by an ultrasound within 30 days by 0.87 percentage
points (1.02 − 0.15 = 0.87). In contrast, the effect was stronger by additional 0.35
percentage points (OR = 1.05, p < .001) in states where the notification explicitly
mentioned that patients might benefit from supplemental breast cancer testing, and
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Table 3.4: Summary of the effects of characteristics of policies regarding dense breast
tissue on the probability of screening mammography follow-up by a breast ultrasound
within 30 days
OR RD p
Policies A–G (notification law)
Health care providers mandated to send notifications 1.15 +1.02 p.p. ***
to women with dense breast tissue (ref.)
+ To all women regardless of breast tissue density 0.98 −0.15 p.p. ***
+ Sending notifications suggested, not mandated 0.95 −0.40 p.p. .
+ Notifications suggest supplemental imaging 1.05 +0.35 p.p. ***
+ Insurance coverage mandated (insurance law) 1.60 +3.50 p.p. ***
Policy H (summary law)
Summary provided by Department of Public Health 1.08 +0.42 p.p. ***
(supplemental imaging not suggested, insurance
coverage already mandated)
Policy I (insurance law)
Insurance coverage mandated without a policy to 1.02 +0.11 p.p. .
increase awareness of breast density
Notes: OR = odds ratio, RD = risk difference, p.p. = percentage point. Reported
statistical significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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by additional 3.50 percentage points (OR = 1.60, p < .001) in states where health
plans were required to pay for that supplemental imaging. Compared to the “basic
notification law,” the effect was weaker when notification of patients was only sug-
gested, but not mandated (Policy G). Although the reduction of the effect was not
statistically significant for follow-up within 30 days, it was statistically significant
for follow-up within 60 and 90 days (Supplementary Tables B.2 and B.3).
In contrast, the 2014 policy in Illinois (Policy H) that mandated the state’s De-
partment of Public Health publish a summary about breast density while health
plans were already required to pay for supplemental imaging was associated with
a statistically significant increase in screening mammography follow-up by an ultra-
sound within 30 days by 0.42 percentage points (OR = 1.08, p < .001) compared to
the baseline follow-up rate before this law came into effect. Finally, a requirement
for health plans to pay for supplemental imaging without any policy intervention
to improve awareness of breast density among the general public (Policy I) was as-
sociated with a small and statistically non-significant increase in follow-up imaging
within 30 days by 0.11 percentage points (OR = 1.02, p = 0.082) compared to the
baseline follow-up rate. This increase was slightly more pronounced and statistically
significant for follow-up within 60 and 90 days (Supplementary Tables B.2 and B.3).
3.4 Discussion
For many reasons, state governments hesitate to become directly involved in man-
dating specific aspects of health care delivery. However, public pressure from pa-
tient interest groups or lobbyists sometimes forces them to do so, despite the fact
that pressure may be based purely on anecdotal reports, without expert consensus
opinion or strong clinical evidence. The legislation regarding dense breast tissue,
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recently enacted in many states as a result of active advocacy by a patient group,
is a prime example. On one hand, it aims to improve education, prevention, and
treatment of breast cancer. On the other hand, it has been shown to increase pa-
tient anxiety (Yeh et al. 2015). And, supplemental imaging for patients with no
other risk factor provides little benefit to those patients compared to its substantial
cost (Sprague, Stout, et al. 2015). Ideally, these factors would be balanced to make
effective evidence-based policy choices. In the absence of a strong evidence base,
policymakers in many states have been struggling with the design of legislation to
address issues surrounding increased breast density while doing minimum harm to
patients and to health care budgets. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the
first to analyze which characteristics of existing laws regarding dense breast tissue
are associated with increased use of downstream breast ultrasounds.
Our study demonstrated that implementation of laws that increase public aware-
ness of breast density and its adverse impact on the diagnostic sensitivity of mam-
mography (Policies A–H) was associated with increased use of downstream breast
ultrasounds. Overall, there were two major approaches to improve awareness of
breast density among the general public. The first involved sending women who
underwent screening mammography a notification providing them with general in-
formation about breast tissue density as well as their own breast density assessment
(Policies A–G). Most states have enacted such notification laws. The second ap-
proach, a summary law, undertaken only by the state of Illinois, involved mandating
the state’s Department of Public Health to publish a written summary about breast
density (Policy H). The latter approach was less targeted than the former, as it
assumed that interested patients would find the information on their own. Both
approaches to increase awareness of breast density were associated with increased
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follow-up by ultrasounds; however, the effect was stronger for the notification law
approach compared to the summary law approach.
Furthermore, most states that took the notification law approach to increase
awareness of breast tissue density mandated health care providers to send notifica-
tions to their patients. The only exception was Utah where sending the notification
to patients was suggested, but not required. Our analysis did not find a statistically
significant association between implementation of the Utah notification law and the
use of downstream breast ultrasounds. We suspect that health care providers in
Utah likely felt less pressure than providers in other states and thus less frequently
notified their patients.
The notification law approach defined the notification recipient population diffe-
rently. Most states required notifications to be sent to women with heterogeneously
dense or extremely dense breast tissue, while other states required notifications to
be sent to all women who underwent screening mammography. Even though women
with heterogeneously dense or extremely dense breast tissue comprise only a subset
of all women who underwent screening mammography, we found that follow-up by
ultrasound was higher when only women with dense breasts were notified compared
to when all women were notified. We explain this possibly puzzling finding as fol-
lows. When all women who underwent screening mammography were required to
be notified, the mandated notification was often crafted in a general, depersonalized
way. For example, part of the notification in Connecticut reads as:
“If your mammogram demonstrates that you have dense breast tissue
[. . . ] you might benefit from supplementary screening tests. [. . . ] A report
of your mammography results, which contains information about your
breast density, has been sent to your physician’s office and you should
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contact your physician if you have any questions or concerns about this
report.”
Thus, patients have to comprehend that conditional message, look up their own
breast density assessment in their mammography reports, synthesize the given pieces
of information, and ultimately decide whether they want to follow-up with their
physicians for further discussion. Such a series of tasks may be difficult and over-
whelming, or just not deemed worth the effort by many patients.
In contrast, when only women with dense breasts were notified, the mandated no-
tification was typically more direct. For example, part of the notification in Alabama
and New York reads as:
“Your mammogram shows that your breast tissue is dense. [. . . ] Dense
breast tissue [. . . ] may be associated with an increased risk of breast
cancer.”
Such targeted information is much more straightforward and easier for patients to
comprehend. Patients receiving such direct notifications, we believe, are then are
much more likely to react more strongly.
Another important characteristic of the notification law approach is whether
the notifications explicitly mention that a patient might benefit from supplemen-
tal screening tests by an ultrasound or MRI. If a patient decides to discuss her
mammogram result and breast density assessment with her physician, but has no
other information about ways to address the results, she may not be aware of po-
tential next steps. However, if a notification tells a patient that she may benefit
from additional imaging by specific modalities, the patient knows exactly what to
request or discuss with her health care provider. The provider may either moderate
the patient’s demand or simply carry out her now targeted request. Our finding that
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patients were more likely to receive follow-up breast ultrasounds when the notifi-
cation was required to suggest an ultrasound as an option for supplemental testing
supports this hypothesis.
During the study period, two states – Illinois and Indiana – enacted policies that
mandated health plans to pay for supplemental imaging (Policy I) long before those
states enacted policies to improve awareness about breast density. Implementation
of the insurance law approach alone was associated with a much smaller increase in
follow-up by ultrasounds compared to the implementation of notification or summary
laws. This finding supports our hypothesis that patients first must be aware of breast
tissue density and its potential adverse consequences before seeking out supplemental
imaging. Two mechanisms might explain the documented small increase in follow-
up imaging associated with the implementation of the insurance law alone. First,
some patients might have identified the insurance benefit themselves and requested
supplemental imaging from their health care providers. Alternatively, some providers
might have induced demand for supplemental imaging knowing that it would not
cause any financial harm to the patient.
Finally, the highest increase in follow-up ultrasounds was associated when an in-
surance law was coupled with a notification law. This finding suggests that increased
awareness of breast tissue density could have prompted many patients in states with
the notification law approach to request supplemental imaging from their health
care providers but that request was never carried out because of inability to pay or
lack of insurance coverage. The approaches also appear in this or other ways to be
complementary, which may or may not be appropriate given the current level of the
evidence base.
Overall, this study documented that the effect of state legislation regarding dense
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breast tissue was relatively moderate – the screening mammography follow-up by
breast ultrasounds increased by no more than five percentage points in all states
that we analyzed. However, the implications for the health care sector as a whole
are not negligible. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
there were approximately 51 million mammography procedures performed on women
older than 40 in 2013 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2015). Since the
average payment for a breast ultrasound in our sample was $187, each one percentage
point increase in screening mammography follow-up by a breast ultrasound translated
into increased health care spending of roughly $95 million. If all states were to
implement policies mandating health care providers to send notifications suggesting
supplemental breast ultrasound imaging for all women with heterogeneously dense
and extremely dense breast tissue, while also mandating health plans to pay for the
supplemental imaging, total health care spending would increase by almost $500
million while providing little benefit to the population as a whole (Sprague, Stout,
et al. 2015).
3.4.1 Limitations
The study has several limitations. First, it is observational in nature, and therefore
the estimated coefficients should be interpreted as associations rather than causal
effects. Although some unobserved factors other than the newly implemented policy
regarding dense breast tissue could have influenced the follow-up to screening mam-
mography, the longitudinal design of the study and differential timing of each state
policy implementation minimized the possibility of our estimates being confounded.
Second, we studied the effect of some, but not all, characteristics of legislation regar-
ding dense breast tissue. For example, all states that had implemented a notification
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law during the study period mandated specific wording of the notifications, but the
wording differed by state. Previous research demonstrated that the readability of
the notifications measured by Flesch-Kinkaid and Dale-Chall scales, as well as the
understandability measured by the Patient Education Materials Assessment Tool,
varied considerably by state (Kressin, Gunn, and Battaglia 2016).
Third, we measured the effect of various state-level policies on patient-level out-
comes, and we assumed exposure to a particular policy based on patient’s state of
residence. Such approximations, however, were likely not completely precise. For ex-
ample, notification laws applied to health care providers in particular states. Thus,
patients with a permanent residence in one state who were receiving care in a neigh-
boring or other state could have remained unexposed to the notifications. Similarly,
the insurance laws applied to health plans operating in particular states and pa-
tients residing in those states who were beneficiaries of an out-of-state health plan
could also have remained unexposed to the mandated health insurance benefit. We
performed a supplementary analysis on a subset of our data that contained both
patient state of residence and provider locations, and found that approximately 85%
of screening mammography procedures were performed in the same state as the pa-
tient’s residence (Figure 2.5). Thus, the documented effects in the study likely are
underestimated.
Fourth, only Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, and New Jersey implemented policies
that mandated health plans to pay for supplemental imaging. We had no informa-
tion about each health plan’s benefit design. It is possible that some health plans in
the other analyzed states covered the expenses associated with supplemental imag-
ing even without a mandate. However, even if plans did not include supplemental
imaging in their benefits, it is possible that some beneficiaries underwent breast
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ultrasounds after screening mammography and paid for it out-of-pocket. Such en-
counters were not captured in the claims data. Finally, our data source was a large
convenience sample of health care claims of individuals enrolled in private, employer-
sponsored health plans. Therefore, our findings should be interpreted with caution as
they may not be generalizable to other privately-insured populations or the Medicare
and Medicaid populations.
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Chapter 4
Concluding remarks
Legislation regarding dense breast tissue has been enacted in many states across
the U.S. as a result of powerful advocacy by a public charity, while scientific evi-
dence about the impact of the notifications is lacking. State governments facing
pressure from interest groups sometimes respond to demands to demonstrate their
responsiveness to the public. Policymakers then have to decide to what degree the
government should become involved. Low-involvement approaches such as a passive
provision of information may not have the impact desired by the interested stake-
holders. But, high-involvement approaches such as mandating certain behaviors of
patients, providers, or payers may intensify the impact, but carry with them consid-
erable costs. Given the lack of consensus among health care professionals and the
limited scientific evidence about best practices in this setting, there is a considerable
variation in several important characteristics of adopted state-level policies.
Most states implemented policies to increase awareness among the general public
about breast density and its negative impact on the sensitivity of mammography.
There were two main approaches to increase awareness about breast density: through
a requirement for health care providers to directly notify women who underwent
screening mammography about their breast density classification and provide them
with information about breast density in general (notification law); or through an
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indirect summary with information about breast density published by the state’s
Department of Public Health (summary law). Moreover, some states have enacted
a policy that mandated health insurance plans to cover expenses associated with
supplemental imaging downstream of screening mammography for women with dense
breasts to increase the access to these services (insurance law).
The research presented in Part I of this dissertation analyzed whether each of
the different legislative approaches affected the utilization of supplemental breast
imaging downstream to screening mammography in the privately insured popula-
tion in each state that implemented some form of the legislation between 2007 and
2014. Subsequently, we identified the specific characteristics of the various state-
level policies regarding dense breast tissue that were associated with the screening
mammography follow-up changes.
The information contained in the dense breast tissue notifications encourages pa-
tients to use more health care resources, either in the form of the additional screening,
or in a discussion of the mammogram results with a health care provider. The study
in Chapter 2 provides strong evidence that implementing notification laws led to an
increase in the probability of breast ultrasound imaging following screening mam-
mography in most states, and to an increase in the probability of a breast MRI
following screening mammography in some states. Additionally, the study in Chap-
ter 3 provides evidence that the heterogeneous effect of state legislation regarding
dense breast tissue may be explained by specific and unique characteristics of the
approaches taken by a variety of states.
Our aim was to inform policymakers in states that are still considering enacting
policies regarding dense breast tissue about the possible consequences of different
policy designs on the utilization of downstream care and ultimately on healthcare
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spending. The difficult understandability of the distributed notifications (Kressin,
Gunn, and Battaglia 2016), as well as the absence of a mandate of health insurance
coverage of supplemental breast imaging in many states, may create socioeconomic
and demographic disparities. For this legislation to be truly equitable across popula-
tions, it would need to be paired with a health insurance coverage mandate. However,
such a policy would increase health care spending with unclear long term benefits.
We also hope for our research to inform policymakers in states that already
have implemented laws who may be considering changes to their states’ policies in
the future. The laws in California and North Dakota, for example, have explicit end
dates, which likely were intended for policy reevaluation purposes. Given the ongoing
paucity evidence about the costs, benefits, and harms of supplemental imaging by
other modalities, setting an end date to a policy can ensure that it does not remain in
effect if it has been ineffective or to ensure that it is updated according to the latest
findings. Policymakers may use our results to design new or to redesign existing
policies to continue providing patients with valuable information about breast tissue
density without promoting the overuse of clinically unjustified health services. These
recommendations may change or adapt as the evidence base expands.
Our research adds new evidence about the effect of legislation regarding dense
breast tissue on the use of care. Nevertheless, much still remains unknown about
the optimal strategies for breast cancer screening and prevention that would lead to
the most favorable breast cancer-related health outcomes as well as satisfaction with
health care among women.
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Part II
Supplier-induced demand
in various medical and surgical
specialties in Medicare
and the private health care sector
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Chapter 5
Review of the relevant literature
A large body of theoretical and empirical work has focused on the connection bet-
ween price and provided volume of health care. The existing theory, however, does
not provide any definite prediction of the direction or magnitude of the anticipated
utilization change when relevant prices change, and empirical findings are often in-
consistent and do not collectively support any of the proposed theoretical models.
The following literature review provides an overview of the theoretical foundations
of the relationship between health care prices and utilization, and summarizes the
existing empirical findings.
5.1 Physician agency and supplier-induced demand
5.1.1 The early work on supplier-induced demand
It has been recognized since the seminal work of Arrow (1963) that there is infor-
mation asymmetry between a patient and a health care provider, i.e., between the
demand-side and the supply-side of the health care market. A patient that is experi-
encing health concerns usually seeks care because she does not know how to address
them. On the contrary, a physician with the skills, knowledge, and expertise typically
knows how to better determine a patient’s diagnosis and what would be the most
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appropriate treatment (Wennberg 2010). A patient then hires a physician to address
her health concerns while assuming that the physician will act as a “perfect” agent
in the patient’s best interest (Santerre and Neun 2012), and delegates the decision
about the appropriate treatment to the physician.
The standard economic theory assumes supply and demand to be determined in-
dependently. In the physician agency framework, however, a physician is responsible
for demanding medical services on behalf of the patient. The provider then acts as
both the supply side and the demand side of the market (Evans 1974). Although
there is no doubt that most physicians enter the medical field with good intentions
and they treat patients to the best of their knowledge, it has been well documented
that some physicians may alter a treatment path for their own benefit (Rice and
Labelle 1989; Gruber and Owings 1996; McGuire 2000). They may justify such be-
havior even more easily when there is minimal chance of harming the patient and if
the patient is covered by health insurance, and therefore does not bear the full cost
of the treatment.
In the ideal situation, “the physician assists the patient to demand exactly those
quantities of care of various types that the patient would have chosen if [s]he had the
same information and knowledge the physician has” (Pauly 1980). This framework
was revisited and extended later by Labelle, Stoddart, and Rice (1994). The au-
thors built on the existing understanding of supplier-induced demand as an imperfect
agency relationship (Pauly 1980) by adding another dimension of the effectiveness
of services: whether the service contributed positively to the patient’s health. The
conceptual framework proposed by Labelle, Stoddart, and Rice (1994) is illustrated
in Figure 5.1.
McGuire (2000) defines supplier-induced demand as a situation “when the physi-
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual framework of supplier-induced demand (Labelle, Stoddart,
and Rice 1994)
Effectiveness of service
Yes No
Beneficial Neutral Detrimental
Effectiveness of agency
Yes I III V
No II IV VI
cian influences patient’s demand for care against the physician’s interpretation of the
best interest of the patient.” The situation represented by cell I of the conceptual
framework of Labelle, Stoddart, and Rice (1994) does not represent supplier-induced
demand but rather a useful physician agency, because the physician assists the pa-
tient by demanding a service the patient would have chosen herself if she had the
same information as the physician; moreover, the service is beneficial to the patient’s
health. In contrast, cells IV and VI represent undesirable physician agency because
the physician demands services that are not beneficial to the patient’s health status
and the patient would not have demanded these services herself if she had the same
information as the physician.
Taking a stand on the remaining cells is somewhat problematic. Cell II represents
a situation when the physician is a good doctor but a bad agent. Vice versa, cells
III and V represent situations when the physician is a good agent but a bad doc-
tor. Whether each situation is desirable or not depends on one’s evaluation of “the
importance of respecting patient’s autonomy” (Labelle, Stoddart, and Rice 1994).
Therefore, whether the situations in cells II, III, and V would be considered supplier-
induced demand according to McGuire’s (2000) definition depends on understanding
the patient’s best interest either as the benefit to her health or as respecting her
decision-making autonomy.
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Neither the theoretical framework of Labelle, Stoddart, and Rice (1994), nor
McGuire’s (2000) definition of supplier-induced demand, however, is useful for em-
pirical research. Although it is usually possible to measure service effectiveness, it
is almost impossible to measure the effectiveness of physician agency. We can ob-
serve demand of a patient with a given set of information, but we cannot observe
demand of the same patient if she had a different set of information. Therefore, we
are unable to find out whether a patient (not) demanding a certain service would
have demanded it if she had the same information as the physician. Similarly, no
physician would likely ever admit to knowingly influencing the patient’s demand for
care while aware that service was not in the patient’s best interest. Thus, most
published empirical studies on supplier-induced demand actually measure changes in
utilization rather than supplier-induced demand itself. For consistency purposes, we
will keep with the routinely used but slightly inaccurate terminology.
An increase in health care utilization does not necessarily imply that supplier-
induced demand is present. It is possible that the increase was due to improved
physician agency, which is a desirable outcome. Another important aspect is that
it is not possible to measure supplier-induced demand in cross-section. We only can
observe a change in inducement resulting from another change such as fee reduction.
For illustration, suppose there is a positive level of demand inducement. In cross-
section, we cannot distinguish which services were provided according to the best
ability and knowledge of the physician and which were induced. In contrast, when
physician fees change over a period of time, ceteris paribus, it is possible to attribute
the change of the health care utilization to supplier-induced demand. However, note
that it is still impossible to quantify the original level of demand inducement even
in the latter case.
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Physicians may be tempted to induce the intensity of treatment in cases of not
only payment cuts, but also when there is an increase in physician to population
ratio, and thus, there are fewer potential patients per physician leading to fewer
opportunities to earn income. Such situations are not the focus of this dissertation
research, but any change in physician density in health care markets may be an
observable, thus controllable, confounding factor.
The first empirical studies on supplier-induced demand focused exclusively on
services provided to Medicare beneficiaries because spending of the publicly funded
Medicare program was of high interest to policymakers. Effects of a change in Medi-
care reimbursement policy in 1976 in Colorado have been examined in multiple stud-
ies, which all found support for the supplier-induced demand hypothesis. A decrease
in physician reimbursement led to an increase in the intensity of medical services
provided by general practitioners and internists as well as to an increased intensity
of surgical services (Rice 1984). Similarly, a reimbursement increase led to a decrease
in medical services intensity (Rice and McCall 1982; Christensen 1992), suggesting
that some physicians substituted provision of medical services for leisure.
Results of another set of studies that assessed the impact of reimbursement
changes under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 and 1989 were not
as convincing. McCall (1993) found no change in the utilization of selected, mainly
surgical, services after their corresponding fees reduction, but Escarce (1993) used
the same data and documented that “growth in the volume of the very same pro-
cedures slowed substantially after the reimbursement reduction was implemented”.
Mixed responses to fee changes were found among surgical procedures and associated
services (Escarce 1993a; Lee and Mitchell 1994) as well as among various types of
procedures in the Canadian health care system (Hurley, Labelle, and Rice 1990).
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5.1.2 Economic conceptualization
In 1991, McGuire and Pauly proposed a model of physician behavior to conceptualize
supplier-induced demand for the two main types of empirical studies: response to fee
changes and response to changes in the physicians-to-population ratio. The model
was later extended by Gruber and Owings (1996) to capture the overall demand and
supply conditions in the local health care market. The extended model assumes that
a physician offers two different services and her net income depends on:
1. The number of patients she sees,
2. The margins for each service (the difference between the fee the physician is
paid and the cost of the service to the physician), and
3. The volume of the delivered services, which is determined by a service-specific
level of inducement.
The model also assumes that the physician’s utility depends positively on her net
income and negatively on the level of inducement.
The McGuire and Pauly (1991) model can be used to predict changes of in-
ducement in response to a fee change, i.e., a change in the margin. If the fee for
service A is administratively reduced, while the fee for service B and costs of both
services remain unchanged, then the original equilibrium does not necessarily hold
anymore. The physician then needs to select a new set of inducement levels for
both services A and B to maximize her utility, which leads to potential changes in
the quantities of both services. The effect can be disentangled into two parts: an
income effect and a substitution effect. The income effect (i.e., the response to the
decrease of total income) is the change in inducement if the ratio of quantities of
the two services remains constant. Since the physician gains utility from her income,
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the income reduction would cause her to increase inducement of both services. The
substitution effect captures the change in inducement due to the relative change of
marginal returns for the two services. Since the decrease in the margin for service
A reduces profitability of this service, it may be easier to induce more demand for
service B and less for service A. McGuire and Pauly (1991) distinguish predictions of
their model for two extreme hypotheses: the literal target income hypothesis when
the physician targets a specific level of her income, and therefore, the income effect
is completely dominant; and the profit maximization hypothesis, when the income
effect is completely absent.
When physician contracts with multiple health insurance plans to provide ser-
vices to their beneficiaries, the situation gets even more complicated because the
substitution effect splits into effects across services and across payers, depending
on the relative margins of each contracted service (McGuire and Pauly 1991). The
models of McGuire and Pauly (1991) and Gruber and Owings (1996), however, do
not provide a definite answer to whether the utilization of a particular service would
increase or decrease after either own-price or a relevant service cross-price reduction.
The overall effect depends on whether the income effect outweighs the substitution
effect (McGuire and Pauly 1991; Nguyen and Derrick 1997) and is, therefore, an
empirical question.
Multiple studies used the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model as a theoretical foun-
dation to assess changes in the utilization of health services after a price change. Most
studies focused on quantities of health services provided to beneficiaries of a single
payer, usually Medicare (Mitchell and Cromwell 1995; Nguyen and Derrick 1997;
Zuckerman, Norton, and Verrilli 1998; Mitchell, Hadley, and Gaskin 2000; Mitchell,
Hadley, and Gaskin 2002; Hadley, Mandelblatt, et al. 2003; Hadley, Reschovsky,
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et al. 2009) or Medicaid (McKay and Dorner 1999; Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin 1999).
There was no consensus in the findings, however. Some studies found volume growth
following the own-fee or cross-fee reduction (Mitchell and Cromwell 1995; Nguyen
and Derrick 1997; Zuckerman, Norton, and Verrilli 1998; McKay and Dorner 1999;
Mitchell, Hadley, and Gaskin 2002; Horny´, Morgan, and Merker 2015) suggesting
that the supply of medical services was downward sloping. Other studies found
the opposite (i.e., that Medicare or Medicaid fees were positively related to volume
of services) suggesting that the supply of medical services is upward sloping and
thus consistent with the neoclassical economic theory (Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin
1999; Mitchell, Hadley, and Gaskin 2000; Hadley, Mandelblatt, et al. 2003; Hadley,
Reschovsky, et al. 2009). The findings generally agreed that the effect usually varied
considerably across service types and medical specialties. Few recent studies from
outside the United States documented that the income effect on the number of visits
and the treatment intensity was weak or almost non-existent (Grytten, Carlsen, and
Skau 2001; Carlsen, Grytten, and Skau 2011). An introduction of a fee-for-service
payment system in the Netherlands, however, resulted in an increase in physician-
initiated health care utilization (van Dijk et al. 2013).
5.1.3 Supplier-induced demand in the multi-market situation
Physicians in the United States usually contract with multiple payers; however, only
a few papers have assessed the effect of reimbursement changes on the volume of
provided services in the multiple-payer situation. Similar to the one payer case, the
results did not comprise a coherent answer. Medicare fee cuts resulted in increased
volume (Yip 1998) or no change in volume (Rice, Stearns, et al. 1999) of surgery
in the Medicare market; Medicaid fee cuts resulted in a reduction in the number of
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visits for Medicaid patients (Decker 2009). Nevertheless, all studies demonstrated
that Medicare or Medicaid fee cuts led to increased utilization of medical services in
the privately insured population (Yip 1998; Rice, Stearns, et al. 1999; Decker 2009).
Tai-Seale, Rice, and Stearns (1998) concluded that “[physicians] do not all respond to
payment reduction in the same way, nor in the way predicted by economic models”.
The so-called “stepwise demand” model can be used as an extension to the mul-
tiple payer case of the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model. The stepwise demand
model assumes that the “physician is a price setter in the private market and faces
a downward-sloping private demand curve, and a price taker in the Medicare mar-
ket” (Hadley and Reschovsky 2006). The changes in the volume of provided services
to either Medicare beneficiaries or private insurance beneficiaries then result from
altering the payer mix depending on the relative profitability in the two markets. In
contrast to the cost-shifting hypothesis, the stepwise demand model predicts that
private insurance payments change in the same direction as Medicare fees. It also
predicts that reductions in Medicare fees lead to lower health care utilization in the
Medicare population, and higher utilization in the privately insured population.
The findings of Hadley and Reschovsky (2006) aligned with the model predictions,
as the authors found that “Medicare fees are positively related to the number of
beneficiaries treated and service intensity”. However, the impact of Medicare fees on
the utilization in the private insurance market has not been assessed in the study.
Similar results aligning with the stepwise demand model predictions were found in
research studies by Mitchell, Hadley, and Gaskin (2000) and Hadley, Reschovsky, et
al. (2009). Other studies, however, found the opposite – an increase in the health care
volume provided to Medicare beneficiaries after Medicare fees reduction contradicting
the prediction of the stepwise demand model (Mitchell and Cromwell 1995; Nguyen
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and Derrick 1997; Zuckerman, Norton, and Verrilli 1998; Hadley, Mandelblatt, et al.
2003).
The proposition that providers seek to alter their payer mix has been strongly
criticized by Reinhardt (1999). Reinhardt argues that physicians usually do not
change practice style from patient to patient. He asserts that:
“At any moment in time, the typical physician will have settled on pre-
ferred practice style that is applied to all patients, regardless of their
insurance status. The preferred practice style probably would be an amal-
gam of 1) what the physician has been taught to view as ‘best medical
practice’ in medical school and during residency training; 2) her subse-
quent refinement of the received doctrine on the basis of more recent
literature and continuing medical education; and 3) an adaptation to the
dominant professional norms in a given locality.” (Reinhardt 1999).
However, Reinhardt further notes that financial incentives can influence practice pat-
terns within a community over longer periods. It would mean that only substitution
across services and not across payers should be considered in the multiple-payer case
of the supplier-induced demand model, while the margins should be averaged across
payers on the service level.
The recent Kenneth Arrow Award winning publication of Clemens and Got-
tlieb (2014) deserves special attention in this literature review. The authors studied
changes in medical services utilization in the Medicare population after Medicare con-
solidated the geographic regions across which it adjusted physician fees in 1997. This
event created price shocks in some but not all regions, creating conditions for a perfect
natural experiment. The study results showed that a 2 percent increase in Medicare
fees led to a 3 percent increase in the provision of care to Medicare beneficiaries
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suggesting that supply of medical services in Medicare was upward sloping, which
supports the stepwise demand model predictions, and that physicians are profit-
maximizing rather than income-targeting. Not surprisingly, the effect was stronger
for elective procedures, demand for which is expected to be more elastic than demand
for necessary services. Next, the changes in the utilization did not happen immedi-
ately but rather developed over several years indicating that a long post-intervention
period is necessary for proper assessment of responses to fee changes. This finding
also supports Reinhardt’s (1999) hypothesis that physicians may change their prac-
tice style due to financial incentives, but such practice-style change takes years to
develop. Finally, Clemens and Gottlieb specifically assessed the effect of prices on
the provision of magnetic resonance imaging. They separated non-radiologists, who
may have a strong incentive to induce demand, from radiologists and independent
imaging centers, where the ability to impact the volume of provided services was
limited. The findings revealed that the majority of the volume response was indeed
among non-radiologists.
5.1.4 Summary of the supplier-induced demand hypothesis
To summarize, the supplier-induced demand hypothesis has been a controversial
topic for over four decades. For example, Feldman and Sloan (1988) critiqued the
hypothesis because of inadequate evidence and poor methods applied in the empiri-
cal research performed at that time, but a follow-up publication by Rice and Labelle
(1989) presented a relatively convincing summary of evidence in favor of the hypoth-
esis at least in certain areas and medical specialties. Labelle, Stoddart, and Rice
(1994) also pointed out some common criticisms of studies of the supplier-induced
demand hypothesis such as specification errors (e.g., omitted health status), failure
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to recognize the endogeneity of independent variables (e.g., physician-to-population
ratio), and under-identification of the demand equations.
Dranove and Wehner (1994) challenged the supplier-induced demand hypothesis
by applying the same methods commonly used in similar studies of supplier-induced
demand, however, on a carefully selected service of childbirth assistance. Arguably,
physicians could not possibly induce demand for childbirths. Nevertheless, the au-
thors did indeed find “evidence” for supplier-induced demand. That led to further
debate about whether the provisional conclusions were valid. But a few years later,
in a carefully designed study, Gruber and Owings (1996) provided strong evidence
of supplier-induced demand for Cesarean sections using fertility decline as a natural
experiment. Finally, most studies assessed either the changes in the utilization of
all types of services in the aggregate, or focused on the health care utilization in se-
lected medical specialties such as primary care, general internal medicine, or surgery
(Mitchell and Cromwell 1995; Yip 1998; Mitchell, Hadley, and Gaskin 2002; Hadley,
Mandelblatt, et al. 2003). Radiology services utilization response to fee changes was
assessed only in studies by Nguyen and Derrick (1997) and Clemens and Gottlieb
(2014). Both studies concluded that radiology services seemed to follow an upward
sloping supply curve.
After 2000, the interest in the supplier-induced demand hypothesis temporarily
faded due to the increased proliferation of managed care systems that minimize the
financial incentive for physicians to induce demand, and due to the difficulty to dis-
entangle supplier-induced demand and other factors potentially affecting utilization,
such as decreased waiting times or travel costs (Santerre and Neun 2012). However,
some recent publications such as Hadley and Reschovsky (2006), Hadley, Reschovsky,
et al. (2009), and Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) prove that the relationship between
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health care prices and utilization remains a topical and unresolved issue.
In the age of patient-centered care, the decision about the treatment is not always
exclusively of the provider; though, the information asymmetry between patients and
providers still remains, and providers may still influence the form and intensity of
treatment. From another perspective, it also means that patients actually do not
always fully delegate the treatment decision to the physician, but they participate
in the decision-making process as well. Therefore, patients’ preferences and budget
constraints should be considered because they also influence the utilization of health
care services. Thus, the actual delivered amount of care is a result of the interaction
between the supply side, demand side, and other situational factors that occurred
during the supply and demand interaction (Chandra, Cutler, and Song 2011).
5.2 Demand for health care
There is a lot less controversy about the “true” demand for medical care – that is the
demand that comes directly from the patients and is not influenced by the supply
side. Many studies, especially the famous Health Insurance Experiment, clearly
demonstrated that demand for health care services decreases with increasing price
when patients are not fully covered by a health insurance plan, ergo are responsible
for at least some portion of the cost (Newhouse, Manning, et al. 1981; Manning,
Newhouse, et al. 1988; Zweifel and Manning 2000; van Dijk et al. 2013). Demand for
health care services is generally not very elastic (Manning, Newhouse, et al. 1988),
but the elasticity increases with decreasing perceived need of the particular service.
Neither the McGuire and Pauly’s (1991) model of supplier-induced demand or its
extended version by Gruber and Owings (1996) considers other factors influencing
the demand, such as patient’s out-of-pocket payments, assuming that they remain
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unchanged. This assumption is satisfied only if an individual possesses a health
insurance plan with co-payments as the only way of demand-side cost sharing, or
a generous plan with no demand-side cost sharing at all. However, if a patient is
enrolled in a health plan with coinsurance or a deductible, then a procedure fee
reduction impacts both the provider and the patient. The provider is paid less,
and the patient pays less. In other words, a physician fee reduction increases the
chance that a patient will value the health care service with reduced price to be
worth the cost and is more likely to demand it. Moreover, if the supplier-induced
demand hypothesis were true and physicians did indeed induce demand more after
a fee reduction, it is likely that patients facing a lower out-of-pocket cost would be
more susceptible to agree to undergo a procedure suggested by the physician.
While the model of supplier-induced demand allows the provider to substitute
a relatively wide range of services for demand-inducement, it is unlikely that a physi-
cian would induce demand for irrelevant services. For example, if a patient shows
up with knee pain, the physician would be unlikely to induce demand for shoulder
imaging even if the profit margin for a shoulder MRI were much greater than the
margin for a knee MRI. In such case, the physician could wait for another patient
with a more appropriate condition (i.e., shoulder pain) and she would attempt to
induce demand then. From a patient perspective, the substitution among services
is also unlikely, except for a limited set of close substitutes. For example, a patient
with knee pain does not care about the price of shoulder imaging, no matter how
“appealing” the price is. She would only consider prices of imaging relevant to her
issue, which in this example is a knee MRI or a knee computed tomography (CT).
In other words, the patient has a limited opportunity for substitution. Therefore,
it is mainly the service own-price relevant to the patient, which plays a role in her
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decision-making.
Another important aspect to consider is to consider is whether the patient knows
the price of the service before its provision, as well as the knowledge of their health
plan benefits design. If a patient does not know the price of a service, then the price
cannot influence her demand. Price transparency in the U.S. health care system is
generally poor, however, recent research showed that price transparency for routine
imaging procedures was better compared to price transparency of other health care
services (Paul et al. 2015). In contrast, a telephone survey of a sample of health
plan beneficiaries showed that only about a half of the respondents were aware of
the actual co-payment amount in their health plan design (Benedetti et al. 2008).
Moreover, only a negligible 4% of respondents reported discussing cost with their
physician prior to the treatment initiation; most respondents (79%) reported that
they did not believe their physician could have helped them reduce the cost, and
about a half of respondents reported that they felt it was “inappropriate to discuss
costs with their physician” (Benedetti et al. 2008).
5.3 Provider incentives across medical and surgical specialties
The supplier-induced demand model is based on two key assumptions:
1. Physicians’ income depends on the volume of provided care, and
2. There are mechanisms through which physicians are able to influence the vo-
lume of provided care.
If a physician’s income does not depend on the number of provided services, then
there is no reason to believe the physician would change her practice style after a fee
change. Similarly, if a physician has no means to influence the patient’s demand (e.g.,
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to convince the patient about the necessity of a certain procedure, or simply to order
the procedure on behalf of the patient), then no financial aspects would influence
the physician’s practice style either. Satisfaction of the first key assumption depends
on the physician payment scheme. For example, if a physician is paid on a Fee-For-
Service basis, then her income depends on the volume of provided care by definition.
In contrast, if a physician is salaried, then her income remains fixed regardless of
the volume of provided care. The second key assumption is usually satisfied for
physicians in most medical specialties, but hardly ever for radiologists.
5.3.1 The contrast between radiology and other medical and surgical
specialties
Radiology services are delivered either by a treating physician if she has the skills
and the equipment or by a radiologist to whom a patient is referred by the treating
physician. If the treating physician has the equipment in her office, she has an
opportunity to induce demand, but her income may or may not depend on the
volume of provided services. On the contrary, if the treating physician does not
have the equipment in her office or the intended imaging service is too complicated
and requires a radiologist’s expertise, then the treating physician refers the patient to
a radiology specialist. The radiologist is usually chosen based on availability, patient’s
preferences, or a recommendation from the treating physician after discussing the
options with the patient. In such cases, the treating physician has the opportunity
to induce demand for imaging procedures but has no financial incentive to do so,
because it is the radiologist and the equipment owner, who are reimbursed for the
imaging procedure. However, neither the radiologist nor the equipment owner has the
opportunity to influence the number of services. A radiologist performing a diagnos-
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tic or diagnostic interventional procedure can change the treating physician’s order
without her consent only under certain rare circumstances, such as when the patient’s
health is under immediate threat and further imaging is needed to address the issue.
Previously there was a financial incentive for treating physicians with a stake in
an outside imaging facility to induce demand for imaging and to refer patients to their
own imaging centers (Hillman et al. 1992). In response, Congress prohibited such
self-referrals of Medicare patients under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, also known as “Stark I”. The law was later updated as the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, also known as “Stark II”, which extended the original
reach to other services and applied it to both Medicare and Medicaid programs. Stark
II prohibits physicians or their immediate family members from referring patients
for designated health services to an imaging center with which they have a financial
relationship such as ownership, investment, or compensation arrangement. The Stark
law also prohibits physicians from having a financial interest in hospital subdivisions,
but not in entire hospitals, because hospitals are assumed to be large enough, and
any artificially increased referrals would have minimal impact on physicians’ income.
However, this assumption does not hold for single-specialty hospitals, which often
resemble hospital subdivisions rather than general hospitals, and the financial interest
thus may be large enough to create an incentive to refer patients to more services
(Carey, Burgess, and Young 2007; Carey, Burgess, and Young 2008).
Previous research documented that non-radiologists who can integrate evaluative
and imaging services through self-referrals have increasingly installed advanced di-
agnostic scanners such as computed tomography and magnetic resonance in their
offices (Levin et al. 2008; Bernardy et al. 2009; Baker 2010). Furthermore, cardiol-
ogists may provide nuclear stress testing, urologists may provide radiation therapy,
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and orthopedists may provide diagnostic imaging directly in their office (Clemens and
Gottlieb 2014). Other findings suggest that there are spill-overs of advanced diagnos-
tic imaging growth to general hospitals in markets where single specialty hospitals
are present (Carey, Burgess, and Young 2009). All of these findings confirm that
incentives to provide more radiology services are present in health care markets and
raise legitimate concerns about how reimbursement changes impact the utilization
of health care services.
5.4 Payments for medical services
5.4.1 Medicare fees
Medicare pays health care providers through a system of centrally administered
prices, based on a national fee schedule. A payment from Medicare for a particular
service depends on its believed relative difficulty and resource requirements, which
are expressed altogether in terms of resource-based relative value units (RVU). De-
velopment of the resource-based relative weights is described in Hsiao et al. (1988).
The total number of RVUs for a service is a sum of three components: RVU for
physician work, RVU for practice expenses, and RVU for malpractice expenditures.
“The physician work RVU represents the relative level of time, skill, training and
intensity to provide the service; the practice expense RVU represents the costs of
maintaining a practice including rent, equipment, supplies and non-physician time;
the malpractice expenditures RVU serve to cover the professional liability expenses”
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2014).
There are different RVU values for practice expenses for some procedures de-
pending on the setting (facility versus non-facility) in which the procedure was per-
formed. Thus, the amount of reimbursement for some procedures may differ between
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settings. Furthermore, since there are geographic variations in the costs of practicing
medicine in different areas of the country, each of the three RVU components is ad-
justed by a corresponding geographic practice cost index (GPCI). Finally, to obtain
the Medicare fee for a service, the total number of RVUs for that service is adjusted
by a conversion factor, which primarily converts the RVUs into U.S. dollars, but also
accounts for inflation, projected growth of the economy, etc.
In addition, payments for radiology services are usually split into two compo-
nents: the professional component (PC) and the technical component. The profes-
sional component is paid to the physician for reading and describing the image and
therefore, it consists mainly of the physician work RVU. The technical component
is paid to the owner of the equipment and it consists mainly of the practice expense
RVU.
5.4.2 The relationship between Medicare fees and payments in the pri-
vate health care sector
Physicians are price-takers in the Medicare market and price-setters in private in-
surance markets. Private health insurance payment rates are largely unregulated
and result from negotiations between insurers and providers. The final negotiated
amounts are often unknown to parties outside of the agreement, which means that
price negotiations are hardly ever based on competitive rates as providers them-
selves do not know the rates their competitors had negotiated with the same insurer
(Clemens and Gottlieb 2013). Thus, negotiated prices vary substantially across both
providers and insurers (Dunn and Shapiro 2012).
Clemens and Gottlieb (2013) developed two models of negotiation in private in-
surance markets depending on the relative negotiation power of the two actors: one
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for small providers and one for hospitals and large provider groups. Small health care
providers tend to have little power for negotiation with insurers; and thus, “insurers
often make take-it-or-leave-it offers, based on fixed fee schedules, which tend to be
based in large part on Medicare’s payment menu, perhaps with a scalar markup”
(Clemens and Gottlieb 2013). On the contrary, large provider groups usually nego-
tiate with insurers over payments for bundles of services. The evidence shows that
Medicare has great influence on the prices in the private health insurance markets,
while the strength of the influence is greatest when physician groups are small and
insurance markets are concentrated (Clemens and Gottlieb 2013).
If changes in Medicare fees indeed translated to similar rate changes in private
insurance, then relative marginal returns for the same service across payers would not
change substantially if at all. Thus, a potential substitution effect across payers in
the supplier-induced demand model would be marginalized. This point is consistent
with the hypothesis of Reinhardt (1999) that physicians do not change their practice
style from patient to patient based on health insurance, or in other words, that
substitution of demand inducement across payers is unlikely.
5.5 Procedural code bundling
Winter and Ray (2008) pointed out that the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule may
overstate the relative costs of certain imaging procedures. This finding led to concerns
that the high profitability could create financial incentives for providers to perform
more imaging. In an effort to distribute payments across services fairly and to lower
overall health care spending, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
then cooperated with the American Medical Association (AMA) to identify services
with distinct CPT codes often performed and thus billed together. The underlying
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assumption was that procedures performed together the majority of the time were
technically not two separate procedures but rather two parts of the same service and
thus incurred efficiencies in time and effort. Such services were therefore likely valued
incorrectly in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. Initially, only procedures billed
together 95% of the times were considered for the review; in 2010, the threshold was
decreased to 75% (Hirsch et al. 2013).
To correct for improper coding leading to inappropriate payments, the AMA
continuously introduced new bundled codes for the identified services, while CMS
assigned these codes updated Relative Value Units to “better” reflect the actual per-
formed work. Because the Medicare payments directly depend on the value of the
RVU, any changes in RVUs implicitly affected the payments. The newly assigned
RVUs did not always reflect the actual time and effort efficiencies well (Allen et al.
2011). Although changes in Medicare fees are required by law to be budget neutral
(i.e., they cannot change Medicare’s total payments by more than $20 million), sa-
vings resulting from fee reductions of certain imaging procedures were exempt from
the budget neutrality requirement (United States Government Accountability Of-
fice 2009). Therefore, reduction of fees for the imaging procedures did not lead to
increased fees for other procedures.
Figure 5.2 illustrates CPT code bundling on an example of computed tomography
(CT) of the abdomen and pelvis. Because the abdomen and the pelvis constitute
a single body area, imaging of both regions is commonly performed during diagnostic
efforts. Before 2011, physicians had to bill two separate CPT codes if they performed
CT of the abdomen and the pelvis without contrast material: 72192 for CT of the
pelvis without contrast material, and 74150 for CT of the abdomen without contrast
material. In 2011, a new CPT code 74176 was introduced to describe the relatively
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common imaging procedure of both the abdomen and pelvis without contrast. All
CPT codes that were bundled between 2010 and 2014 are listed in Table C.1.
Figure 5.2: An example of CPT code bundling – computed tomography of the ab-
domen and pelvis
Stand Alone Code 74150 74160 74170
CT abdomen CT abdomen CT abdomen
w/o contrast w/ contrast w/o & w/ contrast
72192
CT pelvis 74176 74178 74178
w/o contrast
72193
CT pelvis 74178 74177 74178
w/ contrast
72194
CT pelvis 74178 74178 74178
w/o & w/ contrast
Notes: The newly introduced bundled codes for the combined CT of the abdomen
and pelvis were defined as 74176: Computed tomography, abdomen and pelvis, with-
out contrast material; 74177: Computed tomography, abdomen and pelvis, with con-
trast material(s); and 74178: Computed tomography, abdomen and pelvis, without
contrast material in one or both body regions, followed by contrast material(s) and
further sections in one or both body regions.
5.6 Theoretical framework
Physicians in the United States operate in a multi-payer market and they often re-
ceive different payments for the same procedure depending on whether the patient
was covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance. The stepwise demand
model, depicted in Figure 5.3, describes such a multi-payer situation, in which the
physician is a price-setter in the private market and a price-taker in the Medicare
market. The physician faces a demand curve with downward-sloping segments from
99
privately insured patients and horizontal segments from patients covered by Medi-
care. Usually, the physician can set the price for uninsured patients or for patients
with a private insurance plan that possesses a weak negotiation position. On the
contrary, the physician has to accept a price from Medicare, Medicaid, and large pri-
vate health insurance plans with strong negotiation positions (Clemens and Gottlieb
2013).
For simplicity, let us assume there are only two insurers in the market – a private
health insurance plan in which the physician can set the prices for offered services,
and Medicare, which sets the prices for the physician and the physician has to accept
them. In the base case, Medicare sets the price at PM0. Aprofit-maximizing physician
then sets the price at PP0 to private insurance beneficiaries to limit the quantity of
provided services at QP0, i.e., where the marginal revenue (MR) from the private
insurance market is equal to the administratively set price by Medicare (point A in
Figure 5.3). Providing more services to private insurance beneficiaries beyond QP0
would not be rational for a profit-maximizing physician because the marginal revenue
from the private insurance market would be lower than the marginal revenue from the
Medicare market. Note that the marginal revenue from the Medicare market is equal
to the administratively set price level PM0. After the physician hits the volume limit
to privately insured patients at QP0, she then satisfies the demand from Medicare
patients as long as the marginal revenue from the Medicare market is greater than
the marginal cost (MC) of her services.
Had there been an excess of demand in the Medicare population, the physician
would provide services up to point B where marginal revenue from the Medicare
market equals marginal cost. The total quantity of services provided to patients in
both private and Medicare markets would then be QT0, while the segment QT0−QP0
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Figure 5.3: Stepwise demand model of a multi-payer health care market
P
ri
ce
Quantity
MC
MR
PM0
PP0
QP0 QT0QT1
PP1
PM1
QP1
E
A
F
B
DP
C
QM0 QT0*
D
MR
Notes: MR = marginal revenue; MC = marginal cost; D = demand curve; index P
denotes private insurance, index M denotes Medicare, index T denotes total, index
0 denotes the base period, and index 1 denotes the period after a fee change. Points
A–F are described in the text.
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would represent the quantity of services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. In con-
trast, had there been not enough demand for medical services within the Medicare
population, the physician would exhaust the Medicare demand at point C. Since
the marginal revenue at point C is still above the marginal cost, a profit-maximizing
physician would attempt to serve additional patients from the privately insured pop-
ulation as long as the marginal revenue stays above the marginal cost at point D.
The total quantity of provided services would be QT0∗ , while the segment QM0−QP0
would represent the quantity of services provided to Medicare beneficiaries, and the
segments between QP00 and the origin and QT0∗−QM0 would represent the quantity
of services provided to privately insured patients.
Now suppose that Medicare reduces the price to PM1. A profit-maximizing physi-
cian would be willing to decrease her price in the private insurance market from PP0
to PP1 in order to increase the quantity of services provided to the more profitable
private insurance beneficiaries QP1. Beyond QP1, the marginal revenue for services
for privately insured patients is lower than the marginal revenue for services provided
to Medicare patients, thus, it is more profitable for the physician to provide services
to the Medicare population until the demand is exhausted or as long as the marginal
revenue stays above the marginal cost at point F . In other words, the quantity of
services provided to privately insured beneficiaries after a Medicare fee reduction
would increase from QP0 to QP1, the quantity of services provided to Medicare pa-
tients would decrease from QT0 − QP0 to QT1 − QP1 in the case of excess demand
in the Medicare market, or from QM0 − QP0 to QT1 − QP1 in the case of limited
demand in the Medicare market.
The stepwise demand model has several implications. A Medicare fee reduction
is expected to lead to a reduction in private insurance prices, and subsequently to
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an increase of health care utilization in the privately insured population. Moreover,
a Medicare fee reduction is also expected to lead to either a decrease or no change
in health care utilization among Medicare beneficiaries depending on whether there
was an excess of demand in that population (Hadley and Reschovsky 2006). Demand
inducement can be possible in the stepwise demand model framework through two
mechanisms (Hadley and Reschovsky 2006). First, if Medicare is not the marginal
payer, i.e. if the marginal cost curve is still below the marginal revenue curve after
exhausting demand from the Medicare population, a profit-maximizing physician
can induce demand among Medicare beneficiaries for example by suggesting more
diagnostic tests to lengthen the horizontal segment A–C of marginal revenue at PM0
(Hadley and Reschovsky 2006). Second, if a price drop is large enough to change the
physician’s marginal utility of income and leisure time, the marginal cost curve MC
would shift to the right, creating more space to satisfy additional demand, which
had not been satisfied before (Hadley and Reschovsky 2006).
There are several assumptions of the stepwise demand model. First, the model
assumes that the physician has a strong negotiation position to set a new price to the
private health insurance plan. However, in the opposite situation, when the private
health plan has a stronger negotiation position over the physician, implications of
the model would be the same. If Medicare reduced a fee for a particular procedure,
a private health plan with a strong negotiation position would likely reduce the
payment for the same procedure too. Thus, the price in the private health insurance
plan would be reduced by a similar degree as the Medicare price (Clemens and
Gottlieb 2013), however, through actions of the health plan, not of the physician.
Second, the model assumes that a Medicare fee change would actually have a financial
impact on both the physician and the patient.
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A provider would be impacted by a price change if her income directly or indirectly
depended on the price of the service. By definition, that is the case in Fee-For-
Service payment schemes such as the one of Medicare Part B. In contrast, physicians
providing services to patients enrolled in managed care health plans such as HMOs
are usually salaried or paid by capitation. Therefore, physicians in those settings
should not be impacted by a particular service price change. In the case when
a physician is not impacted by the fee change, there is no incentive for the physician
to change her negotiated payment structure with the health insurance plans, nor to
change her practice style. Thus, any observed changes in health care utilization would
be due to a potential change to the financial burden of patients such as decreased
out-of-pocket spending, or other factors.
In contrast, a patient will be impacted by a price change if she is covered by
a health plan with coinsurance (demand-side cost-sharing based on a fixed percent-
age of the actual payment to the physician), or by a health plan with a deductible
(demand-side cost-sharing when patient is responsible for a certain amount of her
annual health care spending before the health insurance begins providing payments)
and has not reached the annual deductible amount yet, or if she is uninsured. Anal-
ogously, a patient will not be impacted by a price change if she is covered by health
plan with no cost-sharing at all, or health plan with only co-payments and no coin-
surance or deductible amount.
Note that if a patient were not be impacted by a price change, the private demand
curve DP would be vertical rather than downward sloping. The assumption of the
stepwise demand model would then be violated. In other words, if patients’ demand
were not be impacted by a price change, a physician would not attract more demand
by lowering the price for a particular set of services charged to the private health
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insurance plan. A rational physician would keep the price unchanged and perhaps
would try to induce additional demand by increasing the intensity of services provided
to current patients.
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Chapter 6
Changes in health care utilization
following procedural code bundling and
consequent Medicare fee adjustments
6.1 Research objective
The study aimed to answer two major research questions:
1. Do prices of health services paid by private health plans change in the same
direction and by a similar degree as Medicare fees in cases when the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services perform a substantial reevaluation of the
physician reimbursement scheme, or do physicians tend to offset the cuts made
by Medicare by raising prices charged to private health plans (cost-shifting)?
2. Do physicians in various medical and surgical specialties respond to changes
in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule as well as in the set of prices paid
by private health plans by changing the volume of care provided to Medicare
beneficiaries and private health plan beneficiaries?
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6.1.1 Hypotheses
Using the stepwise demand model as the theoretical framework for our study, we
hypothesized that:
• Prices paid by private health plans will change in the same direction and by
a similar degree as Medicare fees after a CMS physician reimbursement scheme
reevaluation.
• Volume of health care provided to Medicare beneficiaries by physicians in major
medical and surgical specialties except for radiology will either decrease or
remain unchanged in response to reduced Medicare fees.
• Volume of health care provided to Medicare beneficiaries by radiologists will
remain unchanged in the case of reduced Medicare fees.
• Volume of health care provided to private health plans enrollees by physicians
in major medical and surgical specialties except for radiology will increase in
response to reduced prices paid by private payers.
• Volume of health care provided to private health plan enrollees by radiologists
will remain unchanged in the cases of reduced prices paid by private payers.
6.2 Methods
6.2.1 Study design
We exploited the substantial exogenous changes in the Medicare Physician Fee Sche-
dule that resulted from a recent CPT code bundling to study the impact of Medicare
fees on health care prices in the private sector, as well as to study the effect of price
changes on the volume of health care provided in both Medicare and private sectors.
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6.2.2 Study period
Between 2010 and 2014, the AMA performed major changes in the CPT by bundling
codes of procedures that were often performed and billed together. CMS concurrently
assigned updated RVU values to the newly created CPT codes, by which it inherently
changed the payment amount for these procedures. The study period spanned from
2007 to 2014. Thus, it included 3 years before the CPT code bundling and 5 years
during which the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule experienced considerable changes.
6.2.3 Setting
We studied Medicare fees, private sector health care prices, and the use of health
services by Medicare Part B enrollees, and by private health plan enrollees within
defined health care markets. Common definitions of a health care market used in the
literature include Hospital Service Areas, Hospital Referral Regions, and Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSA) (Newhouse, Garber, et al. 2013). For purposes of this
analysis, we use the MSA delineation to define health care markets. MSAs are ge-
ographic entities that consist of counties containing a core urban area of 50,000 or
more population, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social
and economic integration with the urban core (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). The
United States Office of Management and Budget currently defines 381 Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (not including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands). Due to the
dynamic nature of MSAs, some counties lose the status of MSA over time if their
aggregated population declines below the threshold of 50,000 individuals. Similarly,
some counties may gain the status of an MSA over time if their aggregated popula-
tion reaches the same threshold. Of the 381 currently defined MSAs, 241 were newly
1The following MSAs were excluded from the analysis because they did not meet the criteria
of an MSA over the entire study period: Albany, OR; Beckley, WV; Bloomsburg-Berwick, PA;
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defined during the study period, and therefore, we were not able to link claims data
to these markets for all years of the study period. Thus, the final set consisted of
357 health care markets/MSAs illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Health care markets included in the study
Non-MSA
MSA included in the study
MSA not included in the study
California-Lexington Park, MD; Carbondale-Marion, IL; Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA; Daphne-
Fairhope-Foley, AL; East Stroudsburg, PA; Gettysburg, PA; Grand Island, NE; Grants Pass, OR;
Hammond, LA; Harrisonburg, VA; Hilton Head Island-Bluffton-Beaufort, SC; Homosassa Springs,
FL; Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI; Midland, MI; New Bern, NC; Sebring, FL; Sierra Vista-Douglas,
AZ; Staunton-Waynesboro, VA; The Villages, FL; Walla Walla, WA; and Watertown-Fort Drum,
NY.
109
6.2.4 Subjects
We studied health care claims of individuals enrolled in non-capitated private health
insurance plans or Medicare Part B, who resided within MSAs during the study
period. The Institutional Review Board at Boston University Medical Center deter-
mined that the research did not meet the definition of human subject research (IRB
number: H-35093).
6.2.5 Intervention
We use administrative changes in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, especially
those pronounced by the recent CPT code bundling, as exogenous price shocks. The
CPT code bundling affected various combinations of 130 distinct CPT codes and
resulted in formation of 99 new Category I CPT codes and 15 Category III CPT codes
(American College of Radiology 2016; Kassing, Mulaik, and Rawson 2013). These
codes have been billed most often by physicians in the following 5 major medical
and surgical specialties: anesthesiology2, cardiology, internal medicine3, radiology4,
and surgery5. A detailed description of the procedural code bundling is provided
in Section 5.5. Tables 6.1–6.5 show a few illustrative examples of the procedures
affected by CPT code bundling for each of considered physician specialty. All bundled
CPT codes and their predecessor codes are listed in Supplementary Table C.1 in the
Appendix.
2Anesthesiology also included the specialty of pain management.
3Internal medicine also included the following (sub)specialties: general internal medicine, family
practice, geriatric medicine, gastroenterology, nephrology, and preventative medicine.
4Radiology also included the specialty of nuclear medicine.
5Surgery also included the following (sub)specialties: general surgery, colon & rectal surgery,
neurological surgery, orthopaedic surgery, abdominal surgery, cardiovascular surgery, dermatologic
surgery, general vascular surgery, head & neck surgery, surgical critical care, traumatic surgery,
cardiothoracic surgery, and thoracic surgery.
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6.2.6 Data sources
We combined data on outpatient health care utilization by privately insured indivi-
duals extracted from the Truven Health Analytics MarketScan® Commercial Claims
and Encounters databases (MarketScan) of 2007-2014 with data on outpatient health
care utilization by individuals enrolled in Medicare Part B extracted from a 5%
random sample of the CMS Standard Analytical Files for the same period. The
private health plans included in the study were comprised of the following types:
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), Point-of-Service (POS) plan, Consumer-
Directed Health Plan (CDHP), High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP), Exclusive
Provider Organization (EPO), and Comprehensive.
We included all procedures with CPT Category I codes in the 00100-79999 and
90281-99499 ranges, billed as in-network professional claims, delivered either in an
office, outpatient hospital, ambulatory surgical center, emergency room, or urgent
care facility, billed by anesthesiologists, cardiologists, internists, radiologists, and
surgeons. We kept only procedures with either no modifier, a professional component
modifier, or a modifier indicating a separate procedure; we excluded claims with
a technical component modifier. We did not include Category III CPT codes because
CMS does not reimburse physicians for providing procedures with these codes.
Prices of procedures in the private health care sector result from negotiations
between health care providers and private payers. Nevertheless, these negotiations
are neither transparent ex-ante nor publicly available ex-post. Therefore, we had to
approximate the private prices by the actual amounts paid by private health plans
to health care providers, which we found in the claims data. The private payments
were bottom-coded and top-coded at the 1st and the 99th percentile of CPT-specific
distributions of payments in a given year.
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Medicare pays health care providers according to a system of centrally administe-
red prices, based on a national fee schedule. The Medicare Physician Fee Schedule
is updated each year usually with minor adjustments each quarter. We obtained
all releases of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule between 2007 and 2014 from
the CMS website (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2017). Because some
MSAs surpass state borders, providers within such MSAs may receive different pay-
ments for the same procedures due to the respective geographic practice cost indexes.
Therefore, we applied an average GPCI within each health care market to calculate
Medicare fees.
Finally, we extracted market-level characteristics such as the size of the popu-
lation covered by private health insurance, the size of the population enrolled in
Medicare Part B, the number of health care professionals, and local socioeconomic
and environmental characteristics for each health care market/MSA by year from the
Area Health Resources Files (AHRF) provided by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration. The AHRF
data were available for years 2007, 2008, and 2010–2013. We approximated the val-
ues for 2009 using market-specific averages between 2008 and 2010, and the values
for 2014 using the latest available 2013 values.
6.2.7 Data preparation
Because the CPT code bundling inherently changed the coding standards over time,
we had to ensure that procedures were coded consistently across the entire study
period. Thus, we used the predecessor CPT codes (Kassing, Mulaik, and Rawson
2013) to identify instances when all procedures comprising the future bundled code
were provided to a patient on the same day. Subsequently, we summed the pay-
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ments/fees for the individual predecessor CPT codes and assigned this encounter
the appropriate CPT code according to the most recent coding standards.
Due to the emerging need for a more precise definition of the performed pro-
cedures, the CPT code bundling was in some cases equivocal. For example, the
combination of predecessor CPT codes 64472 and 77003 that described “injection(s)
of diagnostic or therapeutic agent, paravertebral facet joint with image guidance
(fluoroscopy or CT), cervical or thoracic (second level)” was bundled in 2010 into
a newly created CPT code 64491. Before 2010, a third level of the same procedure
had been coded by the very same combination of predecessor CPT codes. However,
the CPT code bundling led to a creation of a new CPT code 64492 to better de-
scribe the performed procedure and to distinguish the second level from the third
level injection. Thus, the combination of predecessor CPT codes 64472 and 77003
could translate either to a CPT code 64491 or 64492. In such relatively rare cases,
we considered the combination of predecessor CPT codes to translate to the lower
level CPT code (64491 in this example).
6.2.8 The relationship between Medicare fees and payments in the pri-
vate health care sector
To analyze whether payments for health services in the private sector change in the
same direction and by a similar degree as Medicare fees, we matched a corresponding
Medicare fee to each procedure provided in the private sector based on CPT code,
code modifier, MSA, setting (facility or non-facility), and date of service; i.e. the
amount Medicare would have paid if the same procedure, in the same setting, in
the same health care market, in the same period had been provided to a Medicare
beneficiary instead of a patient with private health insurance. Financially integrated
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providers have a strong incentive to bill outpatient services at a facility rate and
therefore integrated providers in the office setting often bill services with the place-
of-service code of an outpatient hospital (Neprash, Chernew, et al. 2015). Thus,
we matched Medicare facility fees to procedures provided in outpatient hospitals,
ambulatory surgical centers, emergency rooms, or urgent care facilities, and Medicare
non-facility fees to procedures provided in offices.
Provider integration may improve the bargaining position in price negotiations
with private health plans, and therefore integrated providers may negotiate better
prices with private health plans than non-integrated providers. Because the place-of-
service code is a reasonable proxy for provider integration, we stratified the analysis
of the relationship between Medicare fees and payments in the private health care
sector by setting q = {facility, non-facility}. We considered a model
logPikmpqt = α + β logFkmpqt + γkq + φmpq + θmqt + εikmpqt (6.1)
where Pikmpqt denotes a payment for the i
th observation of a procedure with a combi-
nation of CPT code and modifier k, provided in market/MSA m, in setting q, at time
t measured as a sequence of year quarters since the beginning of the study period,
to a patient enrolled in a private health plan type p; Fkmqt represents a Medicare fee
for the same procedure k, provided in the same market/MSA m, in the same setting
q, at the same time t had the patient been enrolled in Medicare Part B; γkq repre-
sents fixed effects for each combination of CPT code and modifier k; φmpq represents
fixed effects for each market-health plan type; θmqt represents fixed effects for each
market-year; and ε is the error term. The log-log specification of model (6.1) was
selected for two reasons. First, the distribution of prices in the health care sector
as well as the distribution of Medicare fees both resembled log-normal distributions.
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Second, the coefficient β can then be interpreted as a percent change in private prices
for each percent change in Medicare fees.
We estimated parameters of model (6.1) on two different, but overlapping, subsets
of procedures. First, we used a subset of procedures consisting only of the 99 CPT
codes bundled between 2010 and 2014. Medicare fees for some of these procedures
experienced considerable changes at the time of the procedural code bundling. This
artificially increased variation allowed us to better capture the relationship between
Medicare fees and health care prices in the private sector. Second, we estimated
parameters of the model using a subset of procedures limited to the top 300 most
commonly billed CPT codes by specialty that we identified from our data. This sub-
stantially more comprehensive subset consisted of 975 distinct CPT codes, included
29 of the 99 bundled codes, and was comprised of 94-99% of all claims submitted by
physicians in the given specialties.
6.2.9 The effect of price changes on the volume of care
Physicians may respond to changes in payments for a particular procedure by chang-
ing the volume of that procedure (own-price effect) or by changing the volume of
other procedure(s) within their specialty (cross-price effect). To account for this
possibility, we measured the aggregated volume of health care on the market level
using 2014 national RVU values for physician work (i.e., excluding RVUs for practice
expenses and RVUs for malpractice expenditure, without using geographic prac-
tice cost indexes). We obtained the volume of care provided in market m, during
time interval t, by physicians in specialty s = {Anesthesiology, Cardiology, Internal
Medicine, Radiology, Surgery}, to patients in sector r = {Medicare, private} as
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a sum
Vmrst =
∑
k
Qkmrst × RVUwork, 2014k (6.2)
of the number Qkmrst of performed procedures with a combination of a CPT code
and modifier k, in market m, at time t, by physicians in specialty s, to patients in
sector r, multiplied by the corresponding RVU value for physician work valid in 2014.
Note that this approach measured the volume of care consistently across time.
The changes in reimbursement due to the CPT code bundling occurred on the
procedure level. However, physicians face a set of prices for individual procedures
from each payer, and a change in reimbursement for one procedure may or may not be
a strong enough incentive. There are several approaches to measuring sets of prices
on the market level such as the sentinel price index, the market basket price index,
and the spending decomposition price index (Neprash, Wallace, et al. 2015). These
indexes have been created with the aim to rank markets across the nation in terms
of “priceyness.” Nevertheless, for purposes of our study, we needed to summarize the
set of prices physicians face in each market from different payers.
Physicians in specialty s provide a set of services Ss = {1, . . . , ns}, and they
are concerned only about prices of the services they provide. The impact of a price
change of service k ∈ Ss could influence a physician’s practice style only if both the
price change and the typically provided quantity of that service were large enough.
In other words, a small change in price of a procedure that is performed rarely
would likely not change the physician’s practice style. However, if the procedure is
performed fairly often, a price change is more likely to have an impact.
Because the quantity of service k delivered in market m during time interval t is
endogenous, we used the market-level percentage shares of services over the entire
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study period to weigh the relative importance of each price into a market-, specialty-,
sector-, and time-specific price index. We calculated a Medicare fee index for each
MSA m, specialty s, and time interval (year quarter) t as
INDEXMedicaremst =
∑ns
k=1 Fkmt ×QMedicarekms∑ns
k=1Q
Medicare
kms
(6.3)
where Fkmt is Medicare fee for procedure k in market m at time interval t obtained
from the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
2017), andQMedicarekms is the quantity of procedure k provided in marketm by physicians
in specialty s to Medicare beneficiaries over the entire study period.
Furthermore, prices of health care services in the private sector are also endoge-
nous. Thus, we substituted the endogenous actual payments with the predicted
values obtained from model (6.1) and we calculated the private sector price index
analogously as
INDEXprivatemst =
∑ns
k=1 Pˆkmt ×Qprivatekms∑ns
k=1Q
private
kms
(6.4)
Both price indexes were adjusted for inflation to 2014 U.S. dollars using the quarterly
Consumer Price Index obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2017).
Finally, to quantify the volume responses to changes in the set of health care
prices, we estimated model
g (E [log Vmrst]) = α + β log INDEXmrst + φmrs + ηtmod 4 (6.5)
for each sector r = {private, Medicare} and each specialty s = {Anesthesiology, Car-
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diology, Internal Medicine, Radiology, Surgery}, where Vmrst is the volume of health
care measured in 2014 national RVU values for physician work performed in market
m by physicians in specialty s to patients in sector r = {private, Medicare} over
time interval t; INDEXmrst measures the set of prices that physicians in specialty s
and market m face in sector r during time interval t; φmrs represents market/MSA-
level fixed effects; ηtmod4 represents seasonal fixed effects; and g is a link function.
Because the measured volume of health care Vmrst is a function of the sample size,
we used an offset by log of the number of covered person-years in market m, sector
r, over time interval t to account for different sample sizes in different markets and
sectors over time.
The log-log specification of models (6.5) allowed us to interpret the estimated
parameters β as price elasticities. To preserve this property, we used identity as the
default link function g. For each model, however, we assessed the appropriateness of
the link function and of the overall specification using the Pregibon test (Pregibon
1980), and identified the most appropriate distribution function using the modified
Park test for heteroscedasticity.
6.2.10 Sensitivity analyses
First, our research in Chapters 2 and 3 showed strong evidence that implementa-
tion of legislation regarding dense breast tissue was associated with increased use
of downstream breast imaging, especially by ultrasound. Because these laws were
implemented around the same time as many bundled CPT codes were released, it
is plausible that our estimates of volume responses to changes in health care prices
were confounded. Thus, we adapted model (6.5) to control for implementation of
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legislation regarding dense breast tissue in individual health care markets as
g (E [log Vmrst]) = α + β log INDEXmrst + γ IDBNmt +
+φmrs + ηtmod4 (6.6)
where IDBNmt indicates whether legislation regarding dense breast tissue was imple-
mented in market m in time interval t. We estimated parameters of model (6.6) for
internal medicine and radiology because these two specialties were most likely to be
affected by the implementation of the dense breast notification policies.
Second, we measured the volume of delivered health care Vmrst on the market
level. This measure was inherently contingent on the market sample size. In mar-
kets that were represented by large samples of health insurance beneficiaries, the
measure of delivered health care Vmrst contained more information than in markets
that were represented by small samples. However, each data point ultimately con-
tributed equally to the estimation of parameters of models (6.5), even though we
applied an offset by log of the sample size. To mitigate the concern that a “sample
size” effect was present, we re-estimated models (6.5) with a log of the sample size
included on the right-hand side of the equation instead of the offset, and we tested
whether the corresponding parameter was significantly different from 1. Failure to
reject this hypothesis meant that there was no statistically significant evidence of
a “sample size” effect. In cases when we found a “sample size” effect, we stratified
the analyzed health care markets into quartiles by sample size and re-estimated the
volume response by specialty and sector for each stratum separately.
Third, our estimates of volume responses to changes in health care prices could
be affected by an “anticipatory effect.” Physicians usually find out about proposed
changes to the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule several months before the update
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comes into effect. It is possible that some physicians, anticipating the proposed ad-
justments, changed their practice styles already in the quarter before the adjustments
actually came into effect. Major changes in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule are
usually implemented at the beginning of a calendar year. Thus, to account for the
potential “anticipatory effect”, we excluded the fourth quarter of each year and re-
estimated models (6.5) using only data of the first three quarters of each year.
In contrast, it is possible that changes in volume of care in response to changes
in the set of health care prices were delayed (Reinhardt 1999). To account for such
possibility of a lagged effect, we adapted models (6.5) as
g (E [log Vmrst]) = α + β log INDEXmrs,t−2 + φmrs + ηtmod4 (6.7)
by delaying the price index by half a year.
Fifth, our private health care claims data contained information only on the
beneficiaries’ MSA of residence but not on the geographic location where health
services were provided. We assumed that majority of health services were provided in
the same market/MSA as the beneficiaries’ residence, however, this assumption was
likely violated in some instances. To mitigate this issue, we analyzed the Medicare
data that did include the information on both beneficiaries’ residence as well as on
the geographic location of service provision to indicate the heath care markets/MSAs
with a large share of procedures performed in another MSA. Although it is reasonable
to expect that Medicare beneficiaries travel less to get health care than privately
insured individuals, the patterns across markets can be expected to be similar. Thus,
we performed additional sensitivity analyses by excluding all health care markets with
more than 50%, and more than 20% of claims performed in other MSAs.
125
6.3 Results
Our sample contained 589,397,539 health care claims of 25,728,243 person-years co-
vered by employer-sponsored, non-capitated private health plans, and 291,974,063
health care claims of 1,284,985 person-years covered by Medicare Part B. The num-
ber of individuals in each of the 357 analyzed health care markets/MSAs ranged
from 258 to 1,880,245 for the private sector, and from 152 to 104,008 for Medicare.
Supplementary Figure C.1 shows the distribution of the proportion of the captured
population in each MSA. The average age of individuals in each market ranged from
25.0 to 42.2 for the private sector, and from 67.1 to 76.3 for Medicare; the proportion
of females in each market ranged from 44.9% to 59.4% for the private sector, and
from 51.8% to 67.3% for Medicare.
6.3.1 The relationship between Medicare fees and payments in the pri-
vate health care sector
Even though prices of health care services in the private sector are generally posi-
tively correlated with Medicare fees (services that are relatively low cost in Medicare
are also relatively low cost in the private sector and vice versa) as illustrated in Sup-
plementary Figure C.2, we found no evidence of any systematic association between
administratively set Medicare fees and negotiated private payments for individual
procedures at a given location and time as illustrated in Supplementary Figures C.3
and C.4. The average Pearson correlation coefficient between the log of Medicare
fees and the log of payments in the private sector calculated by CPT code, modifier,
setting (facility vs. non-facility), and year equaled to −0.047 (SD = 0.189).
Nevertheless, substantial changes in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, such
as those due to the CPT code bundling between 2010 and 2014, tended to be met by
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similar adjustments to payments in the private sector (Figure 6.2 and Supplementary
Figure C.5). The average Pearson correlation coefficient between the log of Medicare
fees and the log of payments in the private sector calculated by CPT code, modifier,
and setting on a subset of the 99 bundled CPT codes over time (one year before and
one year after code bundling) equaled to +0.243 (SD = 0.232). The distribution of
the correlation coefficients between the log of Medicare fees and the log of payments
in the private sector by CPT is illustrated in Supplementary Figure C.6.
Estimated parameters of model (6.1) for each setting (facility, non-facility) and
different subsets of data (the 99 bundled CPT codes, top 300 CPT codes by spe-
cialty and year) are summarized in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. After controlling for CPT,
market-year, and market-plan fixed effects, the association between Medicare fees
and payments in the private sector was positive regardless of the subset of CPT
codes. This finding supports the hypothesis that changes in the Medicare Physician
Fee Schedule tend to be met by similar adjustments of payments in the private sector.
Table 6.6: Association between Medicare fees and payments in the private sector on
a log scale (using only the 99 bundled CPT codes)
Facility Non-facility
Est. SE p Est. SE p
Intercept 2.0338 0.0081 < .001 1.8152 0.0159 < .001
log Medicare fee 0.6620 0.0010 < .001 0.7345 0.0011 < .001
Notes: Fixed effects for CPT-year γkt, market-year θmt, and market-plan type φmp
are not reported. Both models were estimated with the following reference groups:
CPT = 74177 (PC); MSA = Boston, MA; health plan type = PPO; year quarter =
1st quarter of 2007.
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Figure 6.2: Time-series of mean Medicare fees and adjusted mean private payments
by setting for top 3 bundled CPT codes
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Table 6.7: Association between Medicare fees and payments in the private sector on
a log scale (using top 300 CPT codes by each specialty and year)
Facility Non-facility
Est. SE p Est. SE p
Intercept 2.6198 0.0024 < .001 2.4816 0.0011 < .001
log Medicare fee 0.4068 0.0005 < .001 0.4333 0.0002 < .001
Notes: Fixed effects for CPT-year γkt, market-year θmt, and market-plan type φmp
are not reported. Both models were estimated with the following reference groups:
CPT = 99213; MSA = Boston, MA; health plan type = PPO; year quarter = 1st
quarter of 2007.
6.3.2 Medicare fee index and the private price index
Supplementary Figure C.7 shows the changes in the Medicare fee index (6.3), the
private price index (6.4) based on the predicted payments obtained from model (6.1),
and the private price index based on actual payments, by specialty and year. This
figure illustrates the impact of CPT code bundling and consequent Medicare fee
adjustments on the overall set of prices in the Medicare and private health care
sectors faced by physicians in various medical and surgical specialties. We were
unable to calculate the private price index (6.4) for anesthesiology because there
was a very small overlap of CPT codes provided to both Medicare beneficiaries and
privately insured individuals by physicians in this specialty.
The CPT code bundling was associated with changes in payments from Medicare,
in most cases with a payment reduction. Most of the affected procedures have been
provided by radiologists, but many of them have been provided also by physicians
in other medical and surgical specialties. Supplementary Figure C.7 shows that
the Medicare fee index for radiologists dropped noticeably after 2010 when the first
bundled CPT codes were released. Most anesthesiology procedures affected by the
coding changes were released in January 2014. Although the Medicare fee index for
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anesthesiologists was steadily decreasing since 2007 (Supplementary Figure C.7), we
observed a further drop in 2014, likely due to the procedural code bundling.
The Medicare fee index for cardiologists experienced a significant increase in
2009 due to changes in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule other than CPT code
bundling, but then started steadily decreasing back to the original level of 2007. The
average Medicare fee indexes for internists and surgeons did not vary much over time.
Even though it was difficult to attribute these small changes to CPT code bundling,
the variation was exogenous stemming from administrative changes in the Medicare
Physician Fee Schedule.
6.3.3 The effect of price changes on the volume of care
The estimated parameters of models (6.5) of volume responses to changes in health
care prices by sector (Medicare and private) and physician specialty are summarized
in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. The tables also report the link functions, distribution functions,
and the results of the Pregibon tests. All models passed the Pregibon test, except
for the model for the volume of health care provided by internists in the private
sector. We tested all commonly used link functions for that model, but none passed
the Pregibon test. Thus, we report the results estimated using the default identity
link function, but they should be interpreted with caution.
We found that the use of services in the Medicare sector was positively associated
with the specialty-specific Medicare fee index in all analyzed medical and surgical
specialties except for internal medicine. In other words, a reduction in the set of
Medicare fees was associated with a reduction in the volume of delivered care. The
volume of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries was generally price-inelastic (the
absolute value of the estimated price elasticity was less than 1). The price-elasticity
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of volume was the lowest in radiology (0.076, SE = 0.013). We found a negative
association between volume of care in the Medicare sector and the Medicare fee
index for internal medicine (−0.91, SE = 0.038). That is a 1 % reduction in the
overall set of relevant Medicare fees was associated with a 0.91% increase in the
volume of care provided by internists to Medicare beneficiaries.
Except for cardiology, we found the opposite effect of price changes on the vo-
lume of care in the private sector compared to Medicare. The association between
the volume of health services and the private sector price index was positive for car-
diology (0.37, SE = 0.042) and internal medicine (0.47, SE = 0.066), and negative
for radiology (−0.78, SE = 0.054) and surgery (−0.11, SE = 0.047). Similarly as in
Medicare, the volume of care provided in the private sector was price-inelastic for all
considered medical and surgical specialties.
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Table 6.10: Health care volume responses to changes in the Medicare Physician Fee
Schedule by internists and radiologists, adjusted for the implementation of legislation
regarding dense breast tissue
Internal Medicine Radiology
Est. SE p Est. SE p
Intercept 4.3432 0.1670 < .001 −0.8562 0.0548 < .001
log Medicare fee index −0.8537 0.0380 < .001 0.0560 0.0144 < .001
Dense breast legislation
in effect
−0.0678 0.0038 < .001 −0.0139 0.0041 < .001
Notes: Market and seasonality fixed effects, φm and ηtmod4, respectively, are not
reported. All models were estimated with the following reference groups: MSA =
Boston, MA; year quarter = 1 (months January–March).
6.3.4 Sensitivity analyses
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 report the parameter estimates obtained from the modified
models (6.6) that controlled for implementation of legislation regarding dense breast
tissue in individual markets. The results aligned with our findings from the research
in Chapters 2 and 3 that the implementation of dense breast notification policies
was associated with increased use of health care in the private sector. The effect of
the laws on the amount of care was similar in both internal medicine and radiology
(Table 6.11). Implementation of the policy, however, was associated with a small
decrease of the volume of care in Medicare (Table 6.10). Nevertheless, controlling for
implementation of the dense breast notification laws did not substantially sway the
estimated effect of price changes on the volume of care provided by internists and
radiologists in either sector.
We found evidence that the “sample size effect” might have influenced our es-
timates from the main analysis of volume responses to price changes (Table 6.12).
The results of the analysis stratified by market sample size are presented in Supple-
mentary Tables C.2 and C.3. Although the estimated effect size of price elasticity of
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Table 6.11: Health care volume responses to changes in the set of prices in the private
health care sector by internists and radiologists, adjusted for the implementation of
legislation regarding dense breast tissue
Internal Medicine Radiology
Est. SE p Est. SE p
Intercept −2.9885 0.2869 < .001 0.0835 0.2416 .73
log private price index 0.4652 0.0648 < .001 −0.5591 0.0553 < .001
Dense breast legislation
in effect
0.1686 0.0098 < .001 0.1796 0.0127 < .001
Notes: Market and seasonality fixed effects, φm and ηtmod4, respectively, are not
reported. All models were estimated with the following reference groups: MSA =
Boston, MA; year quarter = 1 (months January–March).
Table 6.12: Test of the “sample size effect”
Medicare Private sector
Est. SE p Est. SE p
Anesthesiology 0.8406 0.0726 .028 - - -
Cardiology 0.8160 0.0307 < .001 0.9712 0.0076 < .001
Internal Medicine 0.9166 0.0202 < .001 0.8841 0.0056 < .001
Radiology 0.9846 0.0193 .42 0.9477 0.0071 < .001
Surgery 0.9166 0.0342 .015 0.9130 0.0069 < .001
Notes: The reported p-value signifies whether the parameter that corresponds to log
of sample size is significantly different from 1.
health care volume varied across strata for each specialty and sector, the estimates
were generally consistent in the direction, and in most cases even in the magni-
tude. The most notable differences across strata were in the model for surgery in the
private sector. The evidence from markets represented by small samples suggested
a negative association between prices and volume of care provided by surgeons, while
the evidence from markets represented by large samples suggested the opposite.
Results of the analysis of a potential “anticipatory effect” are summarized in
Supplementary Tables C.4 and C.5. The results remained virtually unchanged from
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the results of the original analysis providing no evidence that physicians would change
their practice style in advance of anticipated price changes. Results of the analysis
of a potential “lagged effect” are summarized in Supplementary Tables C.6 and C.7.
Likewise, the results remained virtually unchanged from the results of the original
analysis providing no evidence that the effect of price changes on the volume of care
would be delayed.
In the Medicare data, we identified 25 MSAs with more than 50% of claims
provided in an MSA other than the beneficiary’s MSA of residence, and 128 MSAs
with more than 20% of claims provided in an MSA other than the beneficiary’s MSA
of residence. We excluded these health care markets and repeated the analysis using
the subsamples of the remaining MSAs. The results are reported in Supplementary
Tables C.8–C.11, however, they experienced little to no changes from the results of
the original analysis.
6.4 Discussion
In this research paper, we studied whether administratively set Medicare fees influ-
ence prices in the private health care sector and whether the volume of care provided
by physicians in selected major medical and surgical specialties change in response
to price adjustments in Medicare and the private sector. We exploited the consider-
able changes in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule that resulted from procedural
code bundling that occurred between 2010 and 2014 as exogenous price shocks in the
Medicare sector. Although we found no evidence of an association between Medi-
care fees and prices in the private health care sector across geographic regions for
individual procedures at a given time, we found strong evidence that Medicare is the
primary setter of health care prices in the United States. Our results suggested that
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volume responses to changes in health care prices were inelastic and varied in both
direction and magnitude by specialty and sector.
Our finding that Medicare fees and prices in the private health care sector are not
correlated across markets at a given time aligns with that of Cooper et al. (2015).
There are two implications of this result. First, the GPCI used by Medicare to adjust
fees for geographic variations in the costs of practicing medicine does not explain the
variation in prices in the private health care sector across regions. Otherwise, we
would have observed a positive correlation between Medicare fees and prices in the
private sector across markets. In other words, we would have observed low Medicare
fees and low prices in the private sector in markets where the cost of practicing
medicine is relatively low, and vice versa. Second, the evidence does not support the
hypothesis that providers charge higher prices to payers in markets where Medicare
pays relatively low fees and thus, providing care to Medicare beneficiaries is not as
profitable. If that were the case, we would have observed a negative association
between Medicare fees and prices in the private sector across markets.
In contrast, Chernew et al. (2010) studied the inpatient health care utilization
and total spending across hospital referral regions and found a positive correlation
in the utilization of care, no correlation in spending, and concluded that this finding
implies an inverse correlation in prices between Medicare and the private health care
sector. It is plausible that different mechanisms of reimbursement negotiation exist
for procedures performed in the outpatient setting and procedures performed in the
inpatient setting.
The CPT code bundling affected coding of dozens of procedures, and the associ-
ated adjustments to the corresponding Medicare fees were sizable for many of them.
For example, the reimbursement for a professional component of the combined CT
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scan of the abdomen and pelvis by Medicare dropped by 29% from $125 to $89 in
2011 when the corresponding CPT codes were bundled. The global payment for the
same procedure experienced an even larger reduction (Horny´, Morgan, and Merker
2015). These adjustments in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule were often met by
similar adjustments to payments in the private health care sector. For example, the
average adjusted payment for a professional component of the combined CT scan of
the abdomen and pelvis in the private sector dropped by 22% from $216 to $168.
The negotiation of reimbursement between health care providers and private health
plans, therefore, seems to follow Medicare’s lead, which aligns with previous findings
of Clemens and Gottlieb (2013).
A reduction of Medicare fees intrinsically causes a drop in revenue for health
care providers. To maintain the original level of revenue without the need to change
practice style, providers could offset their losses from Medicare by simply charging
higher prices to private health plans (a so-called “cost-shifting”). The findings in
this study, however, do not support this hypothesis and add more confidence to the
conclusion of a systematic review by Frakt (2011) that cost-shifting does not happen
pervasively. Moreover, our finding that a change in Medicare fees was followed by
a change in prices in the private sector in the same direction and often by a similar
degree aligns with the prediction of the stepwise demand model (Figure 5.3).
The payments in the private sector followed the lead of Medicare fees almost
precisely for many of the bundled codes, but less so for others. For example, the ad-
justed private payment for CPT 64483 (injection of anesthetic agent and/or steroid
transforaminal epidural, with imaging guidance, lumbar or sacral) did not change in
the facility setting after the bundled code was released even though the Medicare
facility fee dropped notably (Figure 6.2). The adjusted private payment for the same
138
CPT code slightly decreased in the non-facility setting, but the reduction was smaller
than in the fee for a Medicare non-facility setting. Further research is needed to an-
swer why private payments were in lock-step with Medicare fees for some procedures
but not as much for others.
The stepwise demand model, which we used as a theoretical foundation for this
study, predicted that a reduction in Medicare fees would lead to a drop in prices in
the private sector, an increase in volume of care in the private sector, and a decrease
or no change in volume of care in the Medicare sector. Our results supported the
prediction that reductions of Medicare fees would be met by similar price reductions
in the private sector. Moreover, they indicated that the price adjustments were
associated with changes in the volume of provided health care. However, these
changes varied in the direction and magnitude by specialty and sector.
In the Medicare sector, the volume of care was positively associated with an
index summarizing the set of Medicare fees for anesthesiology, cardiology, radiology,
and surgery. This finding supported the prediction of the stepwise demand model.
However, the association between the Medicare fee index and the volume of care
was negative for internal medicine. In the private sector, the association between an
index summarizing the set of private prices and the volume of care was positive for
cardiology and internal medicine. The association was negative for radiology even
when we controlled for implementation of legislation regarding dense breast tissue
that occurred during the same period. Lastly, the association varied across markets
represented by different sample sizes for surgery. These findings did not align well
with the prediction of the stepwise demand model.
Since the CPT code bundling in most cases led to Medicare fee reductions and we
showed that price changes in the private sector followed the changes in the Medicare
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Physician Fee Schedule, our results suggested a substitution of care between the
two sectors in the field of internal medicine. A reduction in Medicare fees, and
therefore also in private prices, was associated with increased volume of care provided
by internists to Medicare beneficiaries and with decreased volume of care provided
to privately insured individuals. This substitution, however, was in the opposite
direction than expected. We suspect that there were two reasons that could explain
this observation. First, Supplementary Figure C.7 indicates that the overall set
of Medicare fees faced by internists was not much lower than the overall set of
prices in the private sector, unlike for other specialties. Therefore, providing care
to individuals covered by private insurance was not substantially more profitable
than providing care to patients covered by Medicare. Second, Medicare beneficiaries
constitute the vast majority of patients treated by internists, and therefore it may
be easier for internists to manipulate the volume of care for patients covered by
Medicare more so than for patients covered by private insurance.
Finally, due to the nature of their work, radiologists lack the opportunity to
influence the volume of care they provide. As expected, we found a relatively weak
association between Medicare fees and the volume of care provided by radiologists in
the Medicare sector. However, we found a strong negative association between private
prices and the volume of care provided by radiologists in the private sector even
when we controlled for implementation of legislation regarding dense breast tissue
in individual markets. We are not aware of any other policy implemented during
the study period that would lead to an increased use of radiology services in the
private sector and not in Medicare. On the contrary, the use of diagnostic imaging,
especially if it involves radiation, has been under scrutiny because of initiatives such
as Choosing Wisely® and we would have expected the opposite effect (Rao and
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Levin 2012; Rao and Levin 2014; Hong et al. 2017). Further research is warranted
to explore the specific causes of the increased volume of health care provided by
radiologists in the private sector.
6.4.1 Limitations
Our study had several limitations. First, although we studied physician behavior,
we used patient-level data and aggregated the volume of care on the market level.
Other exogenous factors such as technological, methodological, and scientific ad-
vances, implementation of certain policies, or endogenous factors such as physician
supply with respect to the size of the population (McGuire and Pauly 1991; Gruber
and Owings 1996; McGuire 2000), availability of technology (McGuire 2000; Chan-
dra, Cutler, and Song 2011; Chandra and Skinner 2012), and provider integration
(Neprash, Chernew, et al. 2015) could have affected the volume of care provided
in health care markets. We included fixed effects to control for general differences
among health care markets (Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973) and fixed effects for
new policies of which we were aware. However, we were unable to adjust our models
for most of the factors stated above.
Second, we measured the volume of care in each health care market by aggregating
the corresponding RVU values across all provided procedures. This measure did not
allow us to observe any procedure-level changes. For example, a reduction in the
price of procedure A could have led to a decrease in provisions of this procedure and
an increase in provisions of a different procedure B. The measure of the volume of care
we used in the analysis allowed us to observe only the marginal change. Similarly,
our measure of the volume of care combined the number of visits and the intensity of
treatment that is conditional on the visit. Future research should disentangle these
141
two dimensions of the provided volume of care.
Third, the procedural code bundling not only affected the coding standards and
prompted CMS to reevaluate the reimbursement for these procedures, but in some
cases the bundling also may have changed the way of practicing medicine. For
example, some of the newly bundled codes included services that certain providers
had deemed not essential before the code bundling but started providing such services
after the new codes were released. Finally, the change in prices for certain procedures
may have affected demand for care among patients with health plans featuring cost-
sharing, especially coinsurance and deductibles. We argue, however, that patients
usually do not know the price of care in advance due to limited price transparency
(Benedetti et al. 2008), and therefore changes in the procedure prices likely had
minimal effect on the demand for care.
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Chapter 7
Concluding remarks
The research in Part II of the dissertation examined the relationship between Medi-
care fees and health care prices in the private sector, and the relationship between
health care prices and the volume of delivered care by physicians in selected major
medical and surgical specialties to patients in both Medicare and the private sec-
tor. Our aim was to provide new evidence based on recent data to policymakers
designing novel payment schemes that intend to contain health care spending while
maintaining the quality of care.
The health care system in the United States is complex. Physicians sell their
skills to multiple types of payers under a spectrum of payment schemes ranging from
Fee-For-Service on one extreme to fully capitated models on the opposite extreme.
Medicare is a particularly strong p(l)ayer in the U.S. health care system. Not only
it is the single payer for an elderly population, but the evidence also suggests that
Medicare is the primary setter of health care prices in the U.S. Prices have been
identified as one of the key problems of the U.S. healthcare system (Anderson et
al. 2003), which have contributed to the high health care spending compared to
other developed countries (Reinhardt, Hussey, and Anderson 2004). Appropriate
adjustments to health care prices through Medicare might be a possible mechanism
to contain cost. However, perverse financial incentives may lead to overutilization
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of care, and any cost containment achieved by lower prices may be moderated by
increased volume.
In order to further inform the aim of influencing cost containment policies, future
research should examine the changes in health care delivery due to price adjustments
in greater detail on the procedure level. Research should also analyze the effect of
price adjustments on the volume of provided care under alternative payment schemes
such as value-based purchasing models. More details on the effects of price adjust-
ments for specific procedures, as well as within alternative payment schemes, could
provide specific action steps that may help reduce health care spending.
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Appendix A
Supplemental materials for Chapter 2
Table A.1: Sample size by state and intervention period
Number of screening mammography procedures
State Pre-intervention Post-intervention Total
AL 283,415 13,540 296,955
AR 108,507 - 108,507
AZ 258,041 2,300 260,341
CA 2,025,473 243,970 2,269,443
CO 305,385 - 305,385
CT 88,106 106,028 194,134
DE 130,108 - 130,108
FL 1,050,663 - 1,050,663
GA 1,346,038 - 1,346,038
HI 4,688 216 4,904
IA 441,809 - 441,809
ID 117,336 - 117,336
KY 417,341 - 417,341
LA 376,815 - 376,815
MA 485,926 - 485,926
MD 604,291 13,932 618,223
MN 226,643 2,732 229,375
MO 525,587 - 525,587
MS 311,073 - 311,073
NC 577,034 66,378 643,412
ND 17,996 - 17,996
NJ 466,720 13,497 480,217
NM 314,767 - 314,767
Table continues on the next page.
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Number of screening mammography procedures
State Pre-intervention Post-intervention Total
NV 130,369 6,473 136,842
NY 1,007,366 315,409 1,322,775
OH 1,204,856 - 1,204,856
OK 349,519 - 349,519
OR 256,901 10,502 267,403
PA 1,106,092 85,187 1,191,279
RI 56,115 334 56,449
SC 902,500 - 902,500
SD 62,901 - 62,901
TN 585,717 18,687 604,404
TX 1,764,654 229,349 1,994,003
UT 38,994 15,882 54,876
VA 439,151 44,490 483,641
VT 23,755 - 23,755
WA 415,541 - 415,541
WI 456,095 - 456,095
WV 149,284 - 149,284
WY 18,098 - 18,098
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Table C.1: List of bundled CPT codes and their predecessors (Kassing, Mulaik, and
Rawson 2013)
Bundled code Predecessor codes
10030 10140 + 75989
19081 19102 + 19295 + 76098 + 77031
19081 19103 + 19295 + 76098 + 77031
19083 19102 + 19295 + 76098 + 76942
19083 19103 + 19295 + 76098 + 76942
19085 19102 + 19295 + 77021
19085 19103 + 19295 + 77021
19281 19290 + 77032
19281 19295 + 77032
19282 19291 + 77032
19283 19290 + 77031
19283 19295 + 77031
19284 19291 + 77031
19285 19290 + 76942
19285 19295 + 76942
19286 19291 + 76942
19287 19290 + 77021
19287 19295 + 77021
19288 19291 + 77021
27096 27096 + 73542
27096 27096 + 77003
27096 27096 + 77012
Table continues on the next page.
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Bundled code Predecessor codes
32554 32421 + 76942
32554 32421 + 77002
32554 32421 + 77012
32554 32422 + 76942
32554 32422 + 77002
32554 32422 + 77012
36147 36145 + 75790
36221 36200 + 75650
36222 36215 + 36216 + 75650 + 75676
36222 36215 + 36216 + 75650 + 75680
36222 36216 + 75650 + 75676
36223 36215 + 36216 + 75650 + 75665 + 75676
36223 36215 + 36216 + 75650 + 75671 + 75680
36223 36216 + 75650 + 75665 + 75676
36224 36216 + 36217 + 75650 + 75665 + 75676
36224 36216 + 36217 + 75650 + 75671 + 75680
36224 36217 + 75650 + 75665 + 75676
36225 36215 + 36216 + 75650 + 75685
36225 36216 + 75650 + 75685
36226 36216 + 36217 + 75650 + 75685
36226 36217 + 75650 + 75685
36227 36216 + 36217 + 75660
36227 36217 + 75660
36227 36218 + 75662
36228 36218 + 75774
36251 35245 + 75722 + 76376
36251 35245 + 75722 + 76377
36252 36245 + 36245-50 + 75724 + 76376
36252 36245 + 36245-50 + 75724 + 76377
36253 36246 + 75722 + 76376
36253 36246 + 75722 + 76377
36254 36246 + 36246-50 + 75724 + 76376
36254 36246 + 36246-50 + 75724 + 76377
37191 37620 + 75940
37192 37621 + 75940
37193 37622 + 75940
37197 37203 + 75961
37211 36246 + 37201 + 75896 + 75898
37211 36247 + 37201 + 75896 + 75898
37211 37201 + 75710 + 75896 + 75898
Table continues on the next page.
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Bundled code Predecessor codes
37212 36011 + 37201 + 75820 + 75896 + 75898
37212 36012 + 37201 + 75820 + 75896 + 75898
37213 37209 + 75898 + 75900
37214 37201 + 37209 + 75896 + 75898 + 75900
37214 37201 + 37209 + 75896 + 75900
37220 35473 + 36245 + 75736 + 75962
37220 35473 + 36246 + 75736 + 75962
37221 35473 + 36245
37221 35473 + 36246
37221 36245 + 37205
37221 36245 + 75736
37221 36245 + 75960
37221 36245 + 75962
37221 36246 + 37205
37221 36246 + 75736
37221 36246 + 75960
37221 36246 + 75962
37222 35473 + 36248 + 75774 + 75964
37223 35473 + 36248 + 37205 + 75774 + 75960 + 75964
37224 35474 + 36246 + 75710 + 75962
37224 35474 + 36247 + 75710 + 75962
37225 35474 + 35493 + 36246 + 75710 + 75962 + 75992
37225 35474 + 35493 + 36247 + 75710 + 75962 + 75992
37226 35474 + 36246 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962
37226 35474 + 36247 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962
37227 35474 + 35493 + 36246 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962 + 75992
37227 35474 + 35493 + 36247 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962 + 75992
37228 35470 + 36246 + 75710 + 75962
37228 35470 + 36247 + 75710 + 75962
37229 35470 + 35495 + 36246 + 75710 + 75962 + 75992
37229 35470 + 35495 + 36247 + 75710 + 75962 + 75992
37230 35470 + 36246 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962
37230 35470 + 36247 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962
37231 35470 + 35495 + 36246 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962 + 75992
37231 35470 + 35495 + 36247 + 37205 + 75710 + 75960 + 75962 + 75992
37232 35470 + 36248 + 75774 + 75964
37233 35470 + 35495 + 36248 + 75774 + 75964 + 75992
37234 35470 + 36248 + 37205 + 75774 + 75960 + 75964
37235 35470 + 35495 + 36248 + 37205 + 75774 + 75960 + 75964 + 75992
37236 37205 + 75960
Table continues on the next page.
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Bundled code Predecessor codes
37237 37206 + 75960
37241 37204 + 75894 + 75898
37241 37204
37242 37204
37243 37204
37244 37204
37619 36010 + 37620 + 75940
47490 47480 + 75989
49082 49080 + 49081
49082 49080
49082 49081
49083 49080 + 76942
49083 49080 + 77012
49083 49081 + 76942
49083 49081 + 77012
49405 32201 + 75989
49405 47011 + 75989
49405 48511 + 75989
49405 50021 + 75989
49406 44901 + 75989
49406 49021 + 75989
49406 49041 + 75989
49406 49061 + 75989
49407 58823 + 75989
64479 64479 + 77003
64479 64479 + 77012
64480 64480 + 77003
64480 64480 + 77012
64483 64483 + 77003
64483 64483 + 77012
64484 64484 + 77003
64484 64484 + 77012
64490 64470 + 77003
64490 64470 + 77012
64491 64472 + 77003
64491 64472 + 77012
64493 64475 + 77003
64493 64475 + 77012
64494 64476 + 77003
64494 64476 + 77012
Table continues on the next page.
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Bundled code Predecessor codes
64633 64626 + 77003
64633 64626 + 77012
64634 64627 + 77003
64634 64627 + 77012
64635 64622 + 77003
64635 64622 + 77012
64636 64623 + 77003
64636 64623 + 77012
74174 72191 + 74175
74176 72192 + 74150
74177 72193 + 74160
74178 72192 + 74160
74178 72192 + 74170
74178 72193 + 74150
74178 72193 + 74170
74178 72194 + 74150
74178 72194 + 74160
74178 72194 + 74170
78012 78000
78012 78001
78012 78003
78013 78010
78013 78011
78014 78006
78014 78007
78451 78464 + 78478 + 78480
78452 78465 + 78478 + 78480
78453 78460 + 78478 + 78480
78454 78461 + 78478 + 78480
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Figure C.1: Distribution of the proportion of captured population in each health
care market/MSA
Private sector
Percentage
0 20 40 60 80
Medicare
Percentage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Notes: The MarketScan database is a non-random collection of large employer-
sponsored health plans across the United States, and therefore, it may not be fully
representative of the privately insured population. In contrast, the CMS Standard
Analytic Files contain a 5% random sample of Medicare claims, and therefore the
distribution of the proportion of captured population in each MSA is fairly normally
distributed around 5%.
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Figure C.6: Distribution of the Pearson correlation coefficient between log of Medi-
care fees and log of payments in the private health care sector calculated by CPT
code, modifier, and setting (facility vs. non-facility)
Pearson correlation coefficient
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Figure C.7: Distribution of the Medicare fee index, private price index (based on
predicted payments), and private price index (based on actual payments) over time
by physician specialty
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